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Abstract 
The aim of this study has been to explore success factors and barriers to the formation and 
implementation of single policy measures and policy packages in transport, and to identify 
strategies to manage such barriers. As a first step, we developed a typology of barriers and 
success factors for policy formation and implementation. Secondly, we carried out an 
empirical analysis of barriers and success factors in four cases of policy packaging: Urban 
Congestion Charging; National Heavy Vehicle Fees; Aviation in the European Emissions 
Trading System and The EU’s First Railway Package. The third and final task was to identify 
more general strategies to manage barriers in policy formation and implementation. A main 
conclusion in this report is that a conscious application of these strategies may contribute 
significantly to successful formation and implementation of even controversial policies or 
policy packages. 
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Executive summary  
Achieving a sustainable transport system is a major challenge in today’s society. Transport is 
continuously increasing its share of greenhouse gas emissions, and aspects relating to 
accessibility, congestion, air pollution, energy demand, accidents and health must be taken 
into account when policies are being evaluated. A key issue for current transport policy 
making is thus to identify policies that are effective in reaching targets, efficient with regard to 
the economy, politically acceptable and practically feasible. Complexity is high and conflicting 
objectives often emerge. It is gradually becoming apparent that in order to achieve this dem-
anding task, single policy measures often need to be combined into packages where mea-
sures mutually reinforce each other. This is what the OPTIC project is about. 
This report deals with one of the most difficult elements in the policy packaging process, 
namely, how to manage barriers regarding policy formation and implementation. A key di-
lemma is that effective policies tend not to be accepted and implemented, while accepted 
and implemented policies often fall short of target achievement. The aim of the report is to 
explore success factors and barriers to the formation and implementation of single policy 
measures and policy packages in transport, and use these as a basis to identify strategies to 
overcome and manage barriers in this respect.  
Three main tasks are taken on in this deliverable. In Chapter 2 we develop a typology of 
policies/barriers. One conclusion from this typology is that policies that are redistributive (i.e. 
imply redistribution of income by taxation or charges) and in particular such that entail spread 
advantages and focused disadvantages (entrepreneur policy) often encounter barriers due to 
lack of acceptance from the public and key stakeholders. The typology could be useful in the 
policy making process, in helping to identify – at an early stage – types of policies that are 
prone to encounter substantial barriers in the formation and/or implementation stages. 
However, the conclusion is not that such policies should always be avoided. Some of the 
most effective and efficient policies that exist are in essence challenging and will always 
meet significant barriers, simply because they require profound changes to current behaviour 
patterns and development trends, i.e. they often include redistributive and entrepreneur 
policy content. The question then is how to develop strategies to manage such barriers in 
practice.  
The second task is clearly related to this question, and consists of an empirical exploration of 
barriers and success factors in four cases of policy packaging:  
• Urban Congestion Charging (with examples from London, Stockholm and Manchester) 
• National Heavy Vehicle Fees (with examples from Switzerland and Germany) 
• Aviation in the European Emissions Trading System (EU level) 
• The EU’s First Railway package (with examples from the implementation process in 
Denmark and Sweden) 
The cases, which represent four key transport policy areas, have been chosen in order to 
include policy packages that the typology suggests would be rather difficult to decide and 
implement, but nevertheless have proven successful in terms of policy formation and/or 
implementation (except for congestion charging in Manchester). If barriers can be managed 
even in these challenging cases, the success factors at work may be generalised to less 
demanding cases as well. However, when talking about success factors, it is important to 
consider how demanding the target used actually is. It may be that a barrier to acceptance is 
overcome by using an intermediate target level that is difficult to reconcile with long-term 
targets, e.g. regarding limiting global warming to 2 degrees.  
The empirical analysis of (mostly) successful policy packages then provides the main input to 
the third task, which is to outline more general strategies to manage barriers in policy 
formation and implementation. The main strategies identified are: 
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• Combining sticks and carrots 
• Expanding the policy scope and developing flexibility in negotiations 
• Trials – a way to legitimacy and acceptance 
• Communicating benefits clearly 
• Using good examples 
• Preparing for windows of opportunities 
• Organisational responsibility and set-up 
• Applying state funding to instigate municipal investments 
• Selection of established or innovative technical solutions 
Although the outcome of practical policy making efforts is always dependent on external 
developments outside the influence of key actors and on the existence of political leadership, 
conscious use of the strategies proposed in this report can increase the likelihood of 
successful barrier management. The strategies identified here may therefore constitute an 
important element of the overall policy packaging framework developed in the OPTIC project, 
and is the main scientific and practical contribution of this report. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background and aim 
Achieving a sustainable transport system is a major challenge in today’s society. Transport is 
continuously increasing its share of greenhouse gas emissions, and aspects relating to 
congestion, air pollution, energy demand, accidents, accessibility and health must be taken 
into account when policies are being evaluated. It is increasingly being recognised that a 
clustering of policy measures into well-integrated policy packages is key in accomplishing 
effective, efficient, acceptable and feasible policies. The OPTIC project is concerned with im-
proving knowledge on how to develop and implement such policy packages. This Deliverable 
summarises the findings of work package 5.  
The aim of work package 5 (WP5) is to explore success factors and barriers to the formation 
and implementation of single policy measures and policy packages in transport and, based 
on this, to identify strategies to manage barriers in this respect. The identification and 
development of such strategies is of key importance in relation to the fulfilment of EU 
transport policy goals and ambitions.  
Figure 1.1 shows the relationships between the different work packages in OPTIC. WP 5 
builds on work packages 1-4, and generates input to work package 6. 
 
Figure 1.1: Structure of the OPTIC project. 
In this report, special attention is given to barriers, success factors and possible strategies in 
relation to policy formation and implementation. Using policy packages might aid accepta-
bility and implementation of measures by combining various elements in an intelligent 
manner (e.g. Ieromonachou and Waarren, 2008; May and Roberts, 1995). However, 
although a policy package can contribute to making the formation and implementation of 
policy measures easier, for other reasons it may encounter stronger barriers than a single 
measure, for instance because it involves more partners and issues and thus creates more 
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complex processes. If the policy goals in a package are vague and conflicting, this may con-
tribute to confusion about what is actually to be implemented (Winter, 1990). Packaging 
competence thus requires intelligence regarding policy content, policy process and inter-
actions between the two. 
1.2 Research design 
To accomplish the aim, we divided the work into three main tasks. The first one was to 
elaborate an inventory based on a literature review of transport policy formation and 
implementation, and further a typology that could serve as a framework for our analysis of 
empirical cases, based on a review of existing research on barriers, success factors and 
policy processes. This typology might in itself constitute a tool for policy makers to categorise 
and understand barriers and success factors related to the formation and implementation of 
policy packages in transport. The second task was to apply this typology to empirical cases 
from transport policy in order to get an in-depth insight into experiences from policy making 
and thus into success factors, barriers and strategies that evolve in practice. This also 
constituted the main basis for our third task, which was to identify more generally valid 
conclusions on strategies to manage barriers to the formation and implementation of single 
policy measures and policy packages. 
1.3 Methodology 
Our research is based upon a combination of literature, empirical case studies and dialogue 
with policy makers. Studies of theoretical and empirical literature contribute to developing the 
typologies presented in Chapter 2 and to the formation of preliminary building blocks for the 
subsequent ‘barrier management strategies’. The typologies are used for structuring and 
analysing the case studies, which serve the purpose of extracting success factors, barriers 
and strategies. 
The research is based on a qualitative approach, in which the empirical basis is constituted 
by a selection of cases chosen mainly because they are rich and interesting illustrations of 
policy formation and implementation issues. The following policy packages were selected: 
• Urban Congestion Charging (with examples from London, Stockholm and Manchester) 
• National Heavy Vehicle Fees (with examples from Switzerland and Germany) 
• Aviation in the European Emissions Trading System (EU level) 
• The EU’s First Railway package (with examples from the implementation process in 
Denmark and Sweden). 
These cases have been chosen in order to include policy packages that the typology 
suggests would be rather difficult to decide and implement, but nevertheless have proven 
successful in terms of policy formation and/or implementation. We expect the learning 
potential as regards strategies to manage barriers to be particularly large in such examples 
(Sørensen, 2008). The Manchester congestion charging scheme is an exception, since it 
was a scheme that failed. Nevertheless it served as important input to our research, not least 
in relation to the more successful stories from London and Stockholm. 
The cases (and the various examples involved in them) enable us to go beyond a superficial 
understanding of policy formation and implementation in transport and learn in detail about 
success factors, barriers and strategies to remove, circumvent or counteract barriers. The 
selection of cases from various modes and policy contexts allows more general conclusions 
to be drawn. For all cases, we pay particular attention to the fact that the cases represent 
policy packages, looking into how combination of single policy measures into a package 
affect the process.  
The cases represent some degree of diversity. They cover three different modes of transport 
(road, rail and air) on different jurisdictional levels (local, national and transnational (EU)). 
Passenger transport and freight transport are both covered. The cases represent different 
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types of measures, different aims and different phases in the policy process, policy formation 
and policy implementation. The examples of congestion charging in London and Stockholm, 
heavy vehicle fees in Switzerland and Germany, and the inclusion of aviation in the Euro-
pean Emissions Trading System (ETS) represent both policy formation and implementation. 
The case of congestion charging in Manchester only represents a policy formation process, 
whereas the case of the EU’s first railway package focuses only on policy implementation. 
The main purpose is not to compare the cases, but the examples within each type of policy 
package will be compared with one another in order to draw conclusions on how the 
processes are influenced by different conditions. The cases constitute our key basis for 
identifying and discussing strategies for managing barriers, although relevant policy literature 
as well as results from a previous OPTIC deliverable (OPTIC, 2011) have also been applied. 
The case studies are all based on existing academic literature, policy documents and 
interviews. The interviews were qualitative and semi-structured conversations with key 
actors. The interviewees were politicians, civil servants, industry representatives, NGO 
representatives and independent experts. The number of interviews and types of inter-
viewees are shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Number of interviews and types of interviewees in case studies 
Case Urban 
Congestion 
Charging  
National Heavy 
Vehicle Fees 
Aviation in ETS The EU’s First 
Railway package 
Number 
interviewees 
 
3+101
 
 4 12 4  
Background 
of 
interviewees 
Politicians 
Civil servants  
Industry 
representatives 
NGO 
representatives  
Independent 
experts 
Civil servants 
Industry 
representative 
Civil servant Civil servants 
 
The interviews were qualitative and semi-structured. They were carried out based upon a 
common interview guide (see annex 2), but the exact conversation and issues explored 
varied from interview to interview and was partly generated also by the interviewee3
                                               
 
1 The examples from London and Manchester are based on 3 interviews altogether. The Stockholm-
example draws on an already existing extensive interview material that was collected by one of the 
OPTIC-researchers together with professor Anders Gullberg, Stockholm Research Institute and KTH 
(Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009). Their earlier research builds on interviews with around 50 persons 
involved in the policy process. The OPTIC-project has benefited from a direct access to this large 
empirical material but is based mainly on 10 of these interviews. 
.  All the 
interviews were recorded. Taking the point of departure in the recorded interview, a 
condensed summary of each interview was made and used for the analysis. All interviewees 
received a draft of the deliverable and have been asked to approve direct and indirect 
quotations. In addition to literature research, policy documents and interviews, dialogues with 
policy making practitioners were part of the methodology used for this deliverable. Hence, a 
workshop was held in Oslo on February 1, 2011 with participants from public administration, 
NGOs, industry and researchers. The background for the workshop was a brief draft deliv-
erable, a presentation by the authors behind the deliverable and comments by two academic 
discussants. Furthermore, when the interviewees were asked to approve quotations, they 
were simultaneously requested to comment on the analyses and conclusions of the draft 
report, and a few interviewees kindly forwarded comments. Finally, we received detailed 
comments on the deliverable from two persons with long experience of policy making 
processes, a transport expert and former member of the Swedish parliament and the vice-
president of the European Federation for Transport and Environment. 
2 The reason that only one interview was performed in the case Aviation in ETS was that during the 
literature review we discovered the work of Buhr (2008), which builds on 26 interviews about the policy 
formation process, some with interviewees that we originally had planned to interview. 
3 For the Stockholm congestion tax and Aviation in ETS, there was an existing interview material. This 
means that material did not follow exactly the interview-guide developed for the OPTIC-project. Still 
however, we made sure to cover the same themes/issues in all cases. 
 How to manage barriers to formation and implementation                                                      of policy packages in transport 
 
10 
 
1.4 Deliverable structure 
In Chapter 2, an inventory of success factors and barriers as well as a typology of success 
factors, barriers and strategies to manage barriers for policy formation and implementation is 
elaborated. This typology is applied in Chapter 3, which includes descriptions and analyses 
of policy formation and implementation processes within four cases (and a total of eight 
examples as explained above). Each case is structured in three sections: About the case, 
The policy process, and Analysis. The cases constitute the main input to the Chapter 4, 
which aims to extract and develop key strategies to manage barriers in transport policy 
formation and implementation. In Chapter 5 we discuss how the findings of this report might 
be integrated in the overall policy packaging framework that is developed in the OPTIC 
project. We also briefly touch upon the potential conflicts between barrier management and 
other criteria for successful policy packages, e.g. effectiveness (target achievement) and 
economic efficiency. Finally, Chapter 6 contains a summary and conclusions of the 
deliverable. 
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2 Typology for success factors, barriers and strategies  
2.1 Introduction 
The term ‘policy’ has many meanings and definitions. We adopt a rather straightforward view 
on policy as ‘public policy’ defined as a decision or a set of interrelated decisions taken by 
political actors concerning goals and means of achieving them in a specified situation 
(OPTIC, 2010). 
Policy can be understood in terms of ideas and/or processes. Policy ideas relate to the aims 
and goals of a certain decision, while the term policy process implies that the process of 
forming and implementing the ideas in practice should also be seen as part of the policy 
making process. This makes it clear that policy is, in essence, never static but under continu-
ous change over time. It is a dynamic process, where the conditions for formation and 
implementation (in terms of actors involved, problem definitions, power relations, etc) are 
changing continuously. 
The policy making process and different aspects of it have been dealt with within different 
fields of the political and organisational sciences, e.g. within literature on public policy (John 
1998), public administration (Rhodes, 1997), decision making (March, 1994) and 
implementation (Hill and Hupe, 2002). The general literature on policy making has 
encouraged numerous studies within the field of transport, focusing on issues such as 
sustainable transport or sustainable mobility (e.g. Banister, 1998, 2002), traffic safety (e.g. 
Andersson and Vedung, 2007), road pricing - sometimes especially congestion charging 
(e.g. Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009) and mega-projects (e.g. Priemus et al, 1998). Transport 
policy research is often motivated by an interest in the particularities or barriers to effective 
policy formation. Compared with the general literature on policy making, the transport-related 
literature is usually more directed towards practically applicable results and problem solving. 
2.2 Policy formation and policy implementation 
Within the literature on public policy or policy analysis it is common to talk about phases or 
stages in policy making (John, 1998). For example Winter (1991) proposes four stages in 
political decision making: 1) agenda setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) implementation, and 4) 
evaluation and policy revision. Other scholars have suggested other and in some cases more 
stages, which indicates that the policy formulation stage could probably be extended and 
split into a number of stages (e.g. Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Hupe and Hill, 2006; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).  
Such models are often based in the assumptions that a (relatively) clear separation can be 
made between politics (policy formation) and administration (implementation), and that the 
policy making process is rational in the sense that a careful and thorough examination of the 
relationship between ends and means is carried out by those responsible for policy making 
(Hupe and Hill, 2006; John, 1998). These assumptions have been criticised for not reflecting 
practice, and so have the stage models. Several writers argue that in real life there is no 
such clear beginning and end as the stage models presume, and that “the policy process 
does not operate at all in the manner hypothesized” (John, 1998: 23). Public policy making 
and implementation often does not follow a sequential and linear process, and is not 
determined by procedural rationality (Hupe and Hill, 2006; John, 1998; March, 1994).  
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In spite of the criticism, stage models in policy making seem to be very persistent4
In this report, we agree with this criticism, and suggest that it is usually not easy to divide a 
policy process in such distinct stages. However, we still find it useful to make a distinction 
between the aspects of 1) policy formation and 2) policy implementation. We define policy 
formation in a straightforward way as the process until an authoritative policy decision is 
taken, while we define implementation as the process of carrying out that policy decision (Hill 
and Hupe, 2002). As for stage models it should however be emphasised that the policy 
formation and policy implementation processes are intertwined and in fact the specific 
content of a policy is often adjusted even during the implementation process. Our analysis of 
success factors, barriers and strategies refers to both policy formation and policy implemen-
tation. As is clear from the case studies presented in Chapter 3, the distinction is more clear 
and relevant in some cases and examples than others. 
 (for 
instance also reflected in the initial policy packaging framework formulated within the OPTIC 
project). Though adhering to the criticism, Hupe and Hill explain the persistence of the stage 
models by arguing that the models, firstly, is normatively attractive because they are founded 
in views on democracy and rule of law (the Western Rechtstaat). Second, because they 
appeals to a general quest for control, and finally, because the orderly neatness of the stage 
models seems psychologically attractive (Hupe and Hill, 2006). 
2.3 Barriers and success factors  
An inventory of policy measures was established as an earlier output of the OPTIC project 
including 79 examples, and barriers were reported to be present in approximately 70 % of 
the examples (OPTIC 2010). Hence, it is not surprising that quite a few authors within the 
transport literature has dealt with barriers and success factors for specific fields of transport 
policy making and at different levels. An inventory of success factors and barriers based on 
some of this literature and specifying briefly the content of the individual success factors and 
barriers is attached in annex 1 to this report. In the inventory, the success factors and 
barriers are classified within different categories. It appears in the inventory that success 
factors as well as barriers represent very different types of factors, that they are usually 
context dependent, and that the definitions of ‘success factor’ and ‘barrier’ applied by the 
authors are broad. In this section we present our understanding of the concepts of ‘success 
factor’ and ‘barrier’. 
Most authors within this field seem to expect the concepts of ‘barrier’ and ‘success factor’ to 
be self-evident and do not explicitly define the concepts clearly, instead applying very broad 
concepts. However, some attempts have been made to define ‘barrier’ and ‘success factor’ 
more clearly. Hence, as regards barriers, a Swedish study on traffic safety politics define 
‘counter forces’ as “public and private actors, that by the way of opinion formation, influence 
decision making and in other ways contribute to impede, delay or weaken traffic safety policy 
because other goals are given higher priority” (Andersson and Vedung 2007:6; our trans-
lation from Swedish). The specific counter forces mentioned in their work are municipalities, 
NGO’s and government agencies.  
Sørensen (2003), on the other hand, talks about ‘institutional barriers’ to integrating 
environmental concerns into transport policy. When a barrier is ‘institutional’, that means that 
it is a “super-individual, routinized practice including connected understandings” located 
within a certain organisation, for instance a Ministry or a planning department, or in the 
patterns of interaction between organisations or administrative units (Sørensen 2003:3). 
                                               
 
4 Hupe and Hill find that “[h]ardly any other insight from public administration or political science has 
been so generally adopted by practitioners as the so-called stages model of the policy process” (Hupe 
and Hill, 2006: 26). 
 How to manage barriers to formation and implementation                                                      of policy packages in transport 
 
13 
 
Within the road pricing literature, barriers are often related to public attitudes and the term 
‘barrier’ can be derived as the public’s lack of acceptance, i.e. problems with negative 
attitudes and resistance to a certain policy measure among the public or other key actors 
(Jones, 1998, 2003; Langmyhr, 1998; Whittles, 2003). The reason behind this can be traced 
back to various factors, such as deeply embedded social norms (Jaensirisak et al, 2005; 
Schade and Schlag, 2003) or low trust in whether the policy measure will really have the 
intended effect (Whittles 2003). Within transport policy literature, it has been stated that 
financial aspects/lack of funding (Banister, 1998, Sørensen, 2008) and unfavorable physical 
conditions (Banister, 2002) may also constitute barriers in practice.  
Fewer authors deal with success factors or ‘key implementation factors’ (Ieromonachou and 
Warren 2008). Sørensen (2003) applies the term ‘institutional potentials’, using the term 
‘institutional’ as explained above. Altogether, success factors represent a diverse collection 
of phenomena. In another article dealing with municipal road noise abatement Sørensen 
(2008:8) derives some “conditions which seems to be important for making municipalities 
actively provide for and implement road noise abatement measures”. A broad definition like 
this is characteristic of the perception of success factors that we can derive from the 
literature (e.g. Banister, 2002; Ieromonachou and Warren, 2008). 
In our work, we apply broad definitions of barriers and success factors – as is done in most 
of the literature. We define a success factor as any factor contributing to policy making 
processes of single policy measures or policy packages, and a barrier as any factor impeding 
or hindering policy making of measures or packages. In principle, any policy making process 
involves barriers as well as success factors, although barriers and success factors can be 
latent and not manifest, or manifest over time due to contextual changes.  
In the remainder of this section we focus on barriers, since barriers and strategies to manage 
barriers are at the core of the report. We define a ‘barrier’ as a factor impeding or hindering 
policy making of single measures or policy packages. Since the word ‘barrier’ has physical 
connotations, we can imagine that in many cases barriers can be removed, overcome 
bypassed or avoided by simply taking another path or road with fewer or smaller barriers, but 
which leads to the same destination. If we omit the physical image, the barrier can be 
managed in other ways. It can perhaps somehow be transformed, deflected, circumvented, 
or even persuaded, or possibly none of this, but it can somehow be possible to counteract or 
compensate for the effects of the barrier. However, in some cases it will not be possible to 
manage the barrier in one or another way and no other path or road exists. In such cases, 
policy making as regards this specific measure or package has to yield, because the barrier 
and the hindrances it establishes are unalterable and do not allow the policy to go forward. 
Unalterable barriers in policy making are factors that due to some circumstances are not 
possible to influence and adjust for actors involved in a certain process. However, since 
hardly anything in policy making is stable, these hindrances might be altered later on due to 
other processes or circumstances. Exactly which factors are alterable or not may vary from 
one situation to another. The first OPTIC report (OPTIC, 2010) provides a useful tool for 
separating success factors as well as barriers. Here, we have developed a slightly modified 
categorisation. Based upon existing implementation research, we found it useful to 
distinguish between: 1) Cultural conditions which is about deeply rooted values and norms in 
society, in the cases we study often manifested through public/stakeholder resistance or 
acceptance; 2) Political conditions, which has to do with the parliamentary game as well as 
pressure group attitudes and behaviour; 3) Legal and regulatory conditions including legisla-
tion and legal power; 4) Organisational/Institutional conditions dealing for instance with roles 
and responsibilities among key actors and coordination issues; 5) Knowledge and 
information of relevance for policy making; 6) Fiscal and financial conditions covering e.g. 
budget circumstances; and 7) Technological and technical conditions which include available 
technology. 
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In the framework presented in Table 2.1 we apply these seven types of barriers which are 
further split into policy formation and policy implementation. There are some overlaps 
between these categories, and they are not mutually exclusive. In this study, they serve as a 
fundamental framework for how to understand specific types of challenges often appearing in 
a policy process. We believe that the seven categories presented in table 2.1 are always 
relevant to reflect upon in the early stage of policy formation and when developing a strategy 
for policy implementation. 
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Table 2.1: Framework of types of barriers with fictitious examples 
 
Types of barrier  Policy formation  Policy implementation  
Cultural conditions/public 
and stakeholder 
acceptance 
Lack of public and/or 
stakeholder acceptance of 
policy 
Lack of acceptance by 
implementation agents and/or 
target group not behaving in 
accordance with policy  
 
Political 
 
Dominance of unfavourable 
leadership or coalition, or 
adversarial environment 
disallowing stable coalition of 
interests about measure or 
package 
 
Disruptive political intervention in 
the implementation phase  
 
Legal/regulatory Necessary legal basis to adopt 
measure or package not in 
place or cannot be established 
legitimately 
 
Necessary legal basis to 
implement measure or package 
not in place 
Organisational/Institutional Inefficient, unclear and 
counterproductive roles and 
procedures for policy formation 
 
Institutional framework not 
conducive to measure or package 
implementation, e.g. unclear 
organisational responsibilities, 
lack of capacity or 
interorganisational conflicts 
 
Knowledge/information Inconclusive evidence available 
at the decision phase 
Insufficient information available 
or being obtained about how to 
implement the measure or 
package 
 
Fiscal/financial Resources to cover costs to 
establish measure or package 
not being authorised 
Resources to cover costs to 
establish and operate measure or 
package not actually delivered or 
obtained despite formal 
authorisation 
 
Technological Mature technology that can 
deliver desired policy outcomes 
is not confirmed or not believed 
to exist 
 
Technology to deliver desired 
policy outcomes does not exist or 
is not allowed to work effectively 
  
2.4 What can raise barriers? 
The content of a policy or a policy package and the context contribute to erecting barriers. It 
is not possible here to go into every possible reason for all of the above-mentioned types of 
barriers, but in the following we highlight some theoretical aspects that can shed some light 
on the question of why some barriers arise. Lowi (1964, 1985) has made a useful catego-
risation of public policy relevant for explaining barriers related stakeholder, public and 
political acceptance. He distinguishes between four types of policies: 
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• Regulatory policies dealing with legislation and sanctions to influence the activities of 
citizens and companies (in this context, e.g. road traffic acts),  
• Distributive policies including most resource policies, research and development and 
business policies (in this context e.g. infrastructure policy). In the long run all public 
policies can be considered redistributive, because some people pay more in taxes than 
they receive in services, but here the assumption is that politics works in the short run, 
and we can define some policies as distributive. 
• Redistributive policies which imply redistribution of income by taxation. Welfare state 
programmes represent traditional examples (but in our context, examples could be 
congestion charges and heavy vehicle fees). 
• Constituent policies imply establishment of governance institutions. Changes in the 
constitution but also other institutional changes in public administration are considered 
constituent policy (in our context, e.g. establishing a new transport agency).  
Lowi does not address the issue of barriers directly, but public and political acceptance could 
be expected to be more likely in the case of formation and implementation of distributive and 
constituent policies rather than regulatory and redistributive policies, because the former 
confer powers and privileges, while the latter impose obligations or positions (see also Ripley 
and Frankling 1982). On the other hand constituent policies might be more likely than the 
other types of policies to experience resistance from public organisations (institutional and 
organisational barrier), because this type of policy often changes the institutional frameworks 
of these organisations (Lowi 1985). 
Another categorisation of public policy emphasises that the extent of likely success or failure 
for formation or implementation of a policy or package depends on whether advantages and 
disadvantages of the policy are concentrated to a small group or divided among a larger 
population. Hence inspired by Wilson, but widely applied within the field of public choice 
theory, the focus for a number of studies has been whether advantages and disadvantages 
of a policy are spread among large groups or focuses on a specific group (Wilson 1980; 
Winter 1991). This results in four policy types (see also Table 2.2): 
• Majority policy, where both advantages and disadvantages are spread, is not likely to be 
decided and implemented because no specific group cares sufficiently. Examples of such 
policies could be consumer protection or gender equality. However, such policies can be 
decided and implemented if organisations or entrepreneurs are able to attract attention. 
• Entrepreneur policy where advantages are spread and disadvantages focused. Groups 
affected negatively by the policy have incentives to organise and struggle against the 
policy, and hence entrepreneur policies are least likely to be adopted, and if adopted, 
they will often fail during implementation. Environmental policy could constitute an 
example of entrepreneur policy, as could policies implying public cutbacks in welfare 
state programmes. 
• Client policy, with focused advantages and spread disadvantages is in contrast most 
likely to be adopted and implemented, because those groups benefiting from the policy 
will be likely to mobilise, while those paying the costs will not. Many distributive policies 
(see terminology by Lowi (1964, 1985) above) can be considered client policies. 
Transport infrastructure projects are also often characterised as client policy, where a 
smaller group benefits from e.g. new road infrastructure or traffic calming, while costs are 
paid by all tax payers. 
• Interest group policy where both advantages and disadvantages are focused. In cases of 
these policies, strong mobilisation from both partners should be expected, and the 
outcome depends on the relative strength of each partner. Traditionally, labour market 
policies have been classified within this category. 
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So, following this terminology, client policy is most likely to be decided and implemented, 
while entrepreneur policy is least likely to be decided and implemented (Wilson 1980, see 
also Winter 1994). Another factor that needs to be considered is whether the net sum of all 
advantages and disadvantages is negative or positive, e.g. if a cost-benefit analysis would 
result in a net benefit or loss. This means that a package that generates a substantial net 
benefit may be accepted despite being a redistributive policy (e.g. congestion charging).   
Table 2.2: Majority, entrepreneur, client and interest group policies. 
 
 Advantages 
Spread 
 
Focused 
Disadvantages 
 
Spread Majority policy 
 
Client policy 
Focused Entrepreneur 
policy 
 
Interest group 
policy 
 
When dealing with institutional and organisational barriers, institutional theory can provide 
explanations for barriers to raise. Following sociologically inspired neo-institutional theory, all 
organisations consist of collections of routines, procedures, and understandings. Organisa-
tions embody specific practices and understandings. For that reason, organisations are not 
just tools or instruments for a certain purpose. On the contrary, they are to some extent auto-
nomous and have their own life, and actions are determined by a logic of appropriateness 
and some degree of path dependency (March and Olsen, 1989).  
This might constitute a barrier when aiming to introduce new measures or policy packages in 
policy formation, as well as in implementation processes. Hence, barriers to the formation 
and implementation of policy packages depend on an action logic and the path and habits 
formed by and within a certain institutional framework (March and Olsen, 1989). Barriers to 
policy packages might also be connected to the inability or difficulties of policy makers in 
dealing with packages if they represent a new and perhaps challenging (in relation to 
established norms and values) way of thinking and acting. It might also be that the necessary 
coordination and collaboration across institutional and sector boundaries constitutes a 
barrier. 
2.5 Towards strategies 
As mentioned in section 2.3, there are different ways to manage barriers. We see strategies 
to manage barriers as conscious and deliberate actions that go beyond doing things “like we 
have always done” or “following established procedures” (Healey, 2007:30). A strategy thus 
needs to build on some kind of innovative approach regarding the way complexities, difficul-
ties or barriers regarding policy formation and implementation are managed. A barrier mana-
gement strategy is thus a conscious and deliberate action (or set of actions) in order to 
handle a barrier, e.g. by removing or circumventing it, or by counteracting its negative 
effects. Andersson and Vedung (2007) argue along these lines within traffic safety policy. 
Other authors have also dealt with such strategies (May, 2005; Sørensen, 2008; Tholstrup, 
et al., 2005). 
The development of adequate barrier management strategies requires, in essence, insights 
into the specific barriers at hand – their constitution and the main reasons behind them. 
Hence, the formation of barrier management strategies can be informed by section 2.4, 
which describes causes for barriers to arise. In the following, we apply the terminologies 
provided in section 2.4 to establish some building blocks for formation of barrier management 
strategies. These building blocks in turn inform and inspire Chapter 4.  
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As regards cultural/public/stakeholder and political barriers it follows from the terminologies 
of Lowi and Wilson that policy makers should aim to establish policy packages with a flavour 
of distributive and client policies and avoid purely redistributive, regulatory and entrepreneur 
policy packages. Hence, for instance if a policy can be considered redistributive, regulatory 
or entrepreneur policy the chances of formation and implementation would increase if it were 
included in policy packages with aspects of majority or interest group policy, or even 
distributive and client policy.  
Lack of timing might also constitute a political – or possibly cultural – barrier, and likewise we 
can imagine strategies to manage such barriers. According to the so-called garbage can 
model (Cohen, et al., 1972), many decision making processes are chaotic and the stake-
holders’ interests and goals are marked by confusion and ambiguity. Furthermore, the 
participants are not the same all through the decision making process, as some decision 
makers leave and new ones enter the process. Hence, a decision-making process is highly 
dependent on temporal relations of different events, and events that occur at the same time 
are associated with each other. A consequence is that the attention devoted to a problem is 
determined just as much by the moment at which that problem arises as by its actual 
significance. Temporal sorting makes it difficult to establish policy packages with an 
intelligent content, so it is likely that policy packages will be the accidental result of temporal 
relations. Attention is a scarce resource in decisions characterised by the garbage can 
model, and hence policy makers that succeed in keeping keep specific problems or solutions 
on the decision agenda have better chances of having them included in a decision (ibid.). 
Hence a success factor might be “persistent repetition of similar ideas and similar arguments 
over a relatively long period of time”, and hence long-term commitment, patience, and 
perseverance are core qualifications for planners and policy makers aiming to have specific 
problems or solutions included in a policy package (March and Olsen, 1989: 86). 
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3 Empirical cases  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present and explore cases from transport policy. Our ambition with this 
outlook to policy practice is to get a more in-depth view and concrete examples of barriers, 
success factors and strategies for policy formation and implementation. As stated in Chapter 
1, we want to cover different types of transport policy contexts; various transport modes; indi-
vidual short-distance transport (in an urban or regional setting), long-distance freight trans-
port and individual long-distance transport. The cases were also chosen in order to find 
policy packages that the typology suggests would be rather difficult to decide and implement, 
but nevertheless have proven successful in terms of policy formation and/or implementation 
(except for congestion charging in Manchester). If barriers may be managed even in these 
challenging cases, the success factors at work may be generalised to less demanding cases 
as well. This led us to the decision to focus on the following policy packages: 
• Urban Congestion Charging (with examples from London, Stockholm and Manchester) 
• National Heavy Vehicle Fees (with examples from Switzerland and Germany) 
• Aviation in the European Emissions Trading System (EU level) 
• The EU’s First Railway Package (with examples from the implementation process in 
Denmark and Sweden) 
It is worth noting that even though the cases illustrate various policy contexts and 
jurisdictional levels, it is only in the case of Aviation in ETS that we focus on the EU policy 
arena. As stated in the Chapter 1, the main purpose is not to make a comparative study, But 
in the cases that involve several examples, it is natural to make some comparison. The 
cases are intended to generate a rich source of empirical information on key success factors 
and barriers for policy formation and implementation, which in turn also constitute the basis 
for a more general discussion of strategies to manage barriers.  
3.2 Urban Congestion Charging  
3.2.1 About the case 
Congestion charging in urban areas is one of the most widely debated urban transport policy 
measures, and has been the object of wide research, literature and political discussions 
during the last few decades (Button and Verhoef, 1998; Schade and Schlag, 2003; Whittles, 
2003; Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009). Since it was first implemented in Singapore in 1975, 
where it was used to discourage motorists from driving in the urban core during peak 
periods, it has been heralded as a potentially effective measure for managing traffic conges-
tion and environmental problems in many cities all over the world (Santos, 2004). Strictly 
interpreted, congestion charging is just one of several forms of road pricing and is concerned 
with managing the demand for road space. It is therefore important to make a qualitative 
distinction between such schemes and other road pricing schemes, such as toll roads, which 
may exist simply in order to recover the cost of infrastructure provision (e.g. the UK M6 
motorway toll and the Severn bridge) (Santos and Fraser, 2006; Pryce, 2008). 
The fundamental challenges surrounding the formation and implementation of congestion 
charging have changed little in recent decades. What has changed, however, is the number 
of actual attempts – both successful and unsuccessful – at scheme implementation. For 
example, in 2003 congestion charging was successfully implemented in London (Transport 
for London, 2003; Banister, 2004; Livingstone, 2004) and a few years later also in Stock-
holm, firstly as a seven month long trial in 2006 and then on a permanent basis from August 
2007 (Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009). In both examples, the congestion charge was part of a 
larger policy package involving a range of other policy measures.  
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This section aims to identify and discuss barriers and success factors for the formation and 
implementation of policy packages involving urban congestion charging. Specifically, we 
direct our attention to the ‘successful’ examples of London and Stockholm and to the 
attempted formation phase in Greater Manchester. Although the latter scheme did not get 
past the referendum stage, it contains valuable insights for the analysis.  
After first outlining the principal features of the London, Stockholm and Manchester stories 
and providing an overview of the broad policy processes involved, the bulk of the chapter 
aims to identify and discuss the key conditions that affected the formation and 
implementation of the congestion charging policy package in each example. 
3.2.2 Policy making and implementation process 
London 
Traffic has been a hotly debated issue of general concern in London and the UK at large for 
several decades. In the 1998 White Paper ‘A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone’, 
the incoming Labour government pledged to reorientate UK transport policy away from a so-
called ‘predict and provide’ ethos and emphasised the need to break increasing rates of car 
dependency (Department of Transport, 1998). Soon afterwards, the 1999 Greater London 
Authority Act set out a new structure of devolved governance for London, comprising a 
directly elected assembly, which eventually, after the first Mayoral election in 2000, was 
headed by executive Mayor Ken Livingstone. Livingstone had focused on the transport issue 
in his electoral campaign, and among other things incorporated a specific proposal for 
congestion charging alongside investments in public transport, as a means to create a more 
sustainable and less congested city (Livingstone, 2004). Livingstone’s Transport Strategy for 
London contained plans to make road pricing a key feature of transport policy for London 
(Greater London Authority, 2001). In other words, when he was elected Mayor of the city in 
March 2000, Livingstone had thus managed to create a clear mandate for a policy package 
including congestion charging. However, there were still barriers to overcome – for instance 
acceptance problems among citizens. Even though there was overall public support for the 
ambition to reduce traffic congestion in the city, people responded negatively to parts of the 
proposal. This motivated an intensive round of public consultation and continuous dialogue 
with other stakeholders, which in turn was an important part of the overall design process, 
eventually ending up in the scheme that came into effect in February 2003.  
In the London congestion charging scheme, motorised vehicles were charged a flat fee of £5 
to enter the city’s central zone. In July 2005 this basic charge level was raised to £8 per day. 
The core measure in the congestion charging scheme was a flat charge for private motor 
vehicles driving in the congestion charging zone. The charging period was active from 07:00 
to 18:30 Monday-Friday and excluded public holidays. Those living inside the cordon 
received a 90% discount. Taxis, motorcycles, buses, emergency vehicles, disabled people, 
and certain low-emissions vehicles were completely exempt from the charge. In addition to 
the charge, TfL also implemented a formal package of complementary measures. Most 
notably, this included a £100 million investment in the bus system, which paid for an 
expanded bus network, bus priority lanes on main routes within and around the charging 
zone and improved facilities for longer trips. Frequency and reliability improvements were 
also made to the London Underground rail system and, in addition, traffic management 
measures related to road maintenance, displaced traffic and parking were included.  
From February 2007, the congestion charging zone was enlarged by a westward extension 
which proved highly controversial. In October 2010, the new Conservative Mayor Boris 
Johnston announced a decision to abandon the westward extension and in early 2011, the 
zone returned to its original cordon. 
The London congestion charge was intended to contribute directly to four of the 10 priorities 
set out in the Mayor’s 2001 Transport Strategy for London. Specifically, it was intended to: 
(1) reduce congestion; (2) make radical improvements in bus services; (3) improve journey 
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time reliability for car users; and (4) make the distribution of goods and services more 
reliable, sustainable and efficient. In addition, the scheme was also intended to generate net 
revenues to improve transport in London more generally (TfL 2003). Later on, a few more 
explicit, measureable targets were presented. The congestion charging scheme was 
expected to lead to: (1) a reduction in total traffic (measured in vehicle miles) within the 
charging zone by 10-15%; (2) an increase in traffic speeds of 10-15%; and (3) a reduction in 
congestion (measured in vehicle delays) of 20-30%. 
 
Stockholm 
Traffic-related problems with noise, air pollution and congestion have been top of the agenda 
for policy-makers and residents in Stockholm over recent decades. Several policy 
interventions have been proposed as a means of addressing these problems, including road 
pricing measures (Isaksson, 2001; Richardson et al., 2010). Over the years, however, a lack 
of outright political power, fragile political majorities and controversies within the main 
political parties have made it difficult to agree on and implement these policy measures in 
practice (Isaksson, 2001, Richardson et al., 2010). However, the election in September 2002 
gave the small Green Party the balance of power both locally in Stockholm and nationally in 
Sweden. They managed to bring in the issue of congestion charging as a central ingredient 
in government negotiations nationally as well as locally in Stockholm, eventually leading the 
national government to decide that a full-scale congestion charging trial would be 
implemented in the city of Stockholm (Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009). The conditions to 
implement the congestion charge (or congestion tax as it was called later on in the process) 
were thus very different to those in London. Instead of having a project champion who was 
personally devoted and had created a clear political mandate to form and implement a 
package involving congestion charging, the congestion charging trial was pushed through by 
a small political party and rested on a fragile agreement between three very different parties. 
The formal decision was taken by the national government, but in practice it was very 
dependent on the engagement from the local coalition in Stockholm, where the main party – 
the Social Democrats – had severe problems in relation to the congestion charge. Their local 
leader Annika Billström, who was also the Mayor of Stockholm, had promised not to 
implement congestion charging if she won the election, and the majority of voters were 
clearly against congestion charging policies. The situation was very difficult in terms of 
acceptance and legitimacy. 
According to the government decision on the congestion charging trial (dated 1 October 
2002), the trial had to be implemented during the existing term of office (which is always a 
maximum of four years) and ‘last over several years’. In the end, the trial was slightly shorter 
than seven months long, from 3 January to 31 July 2006. A referendum held on election day 
2006 resulted in a slender majority (51.3%) in favour of the tax. This paved the way for 
implementation of a permanent scheme in August 2007.  
The Stockholm congestion tax is designed as a cordon around the inner city of Stockholm. 
Motor-vehicles passing through the cordon must pay a fee for each passage made on 
weekdays between 06.30 and 18.29. The tax for each passage is 10, 15 or 20 SEK 
(approximately 1, 1.5 or 2 EURO), depending on the time of day. The maximum amount per 
day and vehicle is 60 SEK (6 EURO). There is no congestion tax during the month of July, 
nor on weekends, public holidays and the day before a public holiday. Emergency vehicles, 
buses with a total weight of 14 tonnes or more, diplomatic vehicles, motorbikes, military 
vehicles and foreign-registered vehicles are all exempt from the tax.  
During the trial period, the aims of the Stockholm congestion tax trial were: (1) to decrease 
traffic and congestion; (2) to enhance accessibility; and (3) to improve the environment. 
During the trial, the tax was deployed together with a range of other measures, most notably 
significant investment in public transport. This included the provision of new bus lines from 
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the outskirts to the inner city of Stockholm, new park-and-ride facilities and improved 
capacity in the subway system. The revenues raised from the scheme were earmarked for 
public transport investment within the Stockholm region. However, this was changed when 
the tax was introduced on a permanent basis. Since August 2007, the tax is instead part of a 
large infrastructure package and contributes to new transport infrastructure in the Stockholm 
region – specifically, the construction of a new motorway in the western parts.  
Manchester 
In the 2004 White Paper ‘The Future of Transport’, the UK national government announced 
the creation of a new funding mechanism for the transport sector, termed the ‘Transport 
Innovation Fund’ (TIF) (Department of Transport, 2004). The TIF was comprised of two 
distinct elements: a ‘Productivity TIF’ and a ‘Congestion TIF’. The Congestion TIF was 
designed to incentivise regional and local transport bodies to “develop and deploy coherent, 
innovative, local and regional transport strategies” (Department of Transport, 2004:18), 
including road pricing, modal shift and improved public transport services (see Butcher 
2010). 
In 2005, the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) was one of eight local 
authority bodies to receive ‘pump-priming’ funds from the UK Department of Transport in 
order to support the development of a comprehensive and coherent anti-congestion strategy 
which, in turn, would form the basis of a bid for £3bn from the Congestion TIF (Butcher 
2010). Together with its partner bodies, AGMA proceeded to develop a technically sound, 
mutually supportive package of infrastructure and regulatory measures designed to tackle 
congestion in Manchester. The main elements of the package included: major investment in, 
and extension of, the existing tram network; a comprehensive congestion charging scheme; 
significant investment in bus services and investment in so-called ‘smarter choices’ 
measures, which included the provision of travel information and measures to support the 
uptake of walking and cycling. 
In 2007, AGMA voted to bid for the TIF and the UK national government let it be known that 
should the package be viable, the funds would be made available. However, opposition to 
the proposed congestion charging scheme mounted throughout 2007/08, involving among 
other things a strong No campaign. In December 2008, a public referendum was held, 
leading to a strongly anti-TIF result, with 21.2% in favour of the package and 78.8% against 
(Sherriff, 2009). As a result, the entire package was abandoned. 
3.2.3 Analysis  
Congestion charging is a typical example of redistributive, entrepreneur policy, where the 
advantages benefit the general public, whereas the costs are paid by a more limited group of 
travellers. According to the typology set out in Chapter 2, those kinds of policies will often 
cause political and cultural barriers in the form of resistance from target groups as well as 
politicians advocating these interests. This also proves to be the case in all three examples 
illustrated here, although most clearly in Stockholm and Manchester. The London story is an 
interesting contrast, illustrating the potential to gain public support for a political manifesto 
that includes such an ‘unpopular’ element as congestion charging.  
In this section, we examine the key conditions that affected the outcome of the congestion 
charging policies in London, Stockholm and Manchester. Needless to say, many more details 
could be added to the stories from all the three cities. Here we focus only on the main 
barriers and success factors for policy formation and implementation. 
First of all, the general conditions for how congestion charging could be launched in London 
and Manchester (UK) versus Stockholm (Sweden) differ greatly. If we look at the overall 
policy context, we note that in the UK in the late 1990s there was already a national political 
consensus over the need to break away from the established transport paradigm. This 
appeared to be a fundamental success factor for congestion charging in both London and 
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Manchester (although not leading to success in the latter example), since it created a basic 
platform and motivation for such a policy measure. In Sweden, the transport policy discourse 
is in general more optimistic towards the possibility to solve transport-related problems within 
the existing transport paradigm, through new technical innovations, alternative fuels, etc. 
(Hultman, 2010).  
Despite the general differences in terms of general understandings about demands for 
changes to the existing transport paradigm, there are other facts to be gleaned from the 
stories of congestion charging in London, Stockholm and Manchester. First of all, lack of 
acceptance/public resistance stands out as a key barrier in all three examples, but the 
strategies to overcome this barrier differ greatly. In London, Mayor Livingstone was a clear 
project champion who had managed to create a strong mandate for the congestion charge 
by including it in his manifesto before the election. The negative reactions that arose later on 
in response to the preliminary scheme proposals could thus be managed fairly easily through 
consultation with key stakeholders and adjustments of details in the scheme.  
In Stockholm, the situation was difficult. The Stockholm congestion tax was to a large extent 
the result of the Green Party’s strategic action after the election 2002. The congestion tax 
decision was taken relatively quickly, with no time to build consensus or internal support in 
the Social Democratic Party or among key voter groups. Moreover, the Social Democratic 
leader in Stockholm, Annika Billström, had actually promised not to implement congestion 
charging during her term of office. Altogether, this meant severe problems in terms of 
legitimacy, support and acceptance, not only from the political opposition but also for Mayor 
Billström, within her own party. The internal criticism and some of the public resistance was 
managed by a number of adjustments to details in the congestion tax scheme. However, the 
general problems in terms of legitimacy remained severe and there was no way to escape 
the demands for a public referendum. Instead of having it in advance, however, the leading 
coalition in Stockholm decided to hold it after the trial. Mayor Billström explained in an 
interview how she thought that: “It wouldn’t be possible to vote in advance, because then you 
wouldn’t know what you are voting about. /. . ./ This is an issue where people need to get a 
chance to see for themselves, to get an experience ‘is it good?’, ‘is it bad?’, ‘how can it be 
improved?, and so on”. In the end, the decision to hold the referendum after the trial stands 
out as crucial. The trial+referendum approach was key for managing the legitimacy deficit, 
and also served as a successful strategy for managing criticism in the preparatory phase. 
Since the referendum eventually led to a slender majority (51.3%) for the congestion tax, it 
paved the way for the implementation of a permanent scheme in 2007, but it was certainly a 
risky approach. A different outcome of the referendum would most likely have led the new 
political majority that took seats nationally as well as regionally and locally in Stockholm in 
the election 2006 to abandon the idea.  
In the city of Manchester, the demands for a referendum were treated differently. The 
referendum, which was held in advance, ended up in a strong majority (78.8 %) against the 
congestion charging scheme and it unlikely that another similar scheme will be proposed in 
the medium-term.  
There was originally no project champion in Stockholm. By taking the initiative for a 
congestion charging scheme, the Green Party to some extent took this role in the policy 
formation stage. However, being such a small party, it did not have a full mandate to act like 
a full project champion. Over time, however, the local coalition between the Social 
Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Left Party managed to build an atmosphere of 
trust and mutual respect. This led to an intensified collaboration and a more creative 
atmosphere in which it was easier for them to solve internal controversies, for instance 
around details in the scheme. In addition, there was a network of policy makers and experts 
who all made dedicated efforts for successful policy implementation, and who worked more 
or less closely to the Mayor and the Congestion Charging Secretariat. Eventually, and 
probably as an outcome of these internal processes, Mayor Billström shouldered a clearer 
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role as project champion, but she was not alone – it was very much a question of team work 
among a handful of key persons from politics and planning.  
The experiences from London and Stockholm thus illustrate two very different (but in both 
examples successful) strategies to create legitimacy for contested and ‘unpopular’ policies. 
The London story shows that it is actually possible to create legitimacy in advance by 
presenting a policy as part of a political manifesto ahead of a general election. The 
Stockholm example illustrates another strategy, namely that of creating legitimacy afterwards 
by the combination of a trial and subsequent referendum. Altogether, however, the three 
cases clearly illustrate the pivotal role of having clear political leadership in challenging 
policies such as congestion charging. It seems that a project champion (which may be a 
single individual or a network of key persons) can make a major difference by initiating and 
promoting the policy, and lead the process and work deliberately from policy formation to 
implementation.  
Another barrier that appeared in the Stockholm example was the lack of a legal and 
institutional framework. In London, Livingstone was endowed with all the powers needed to 
implement a congestion charge, and Transport for London (TfL) possessed a relatively 
extensive jurisdictional scope beyond that of most local authorities or regional transport 
bodies – it possessed a strong packaging competence and could control and initiate other 
measures that were important for the effectiveness, efficiency and technical feasibility of the 
congestion charge. This was not at all the situation in Stockholm, where no legal framework 
existed and where the roles and relationships between key actors and organisations involved 
were extremely unclear. However, since the issue of congestion charging had been part of 
the debate for several decades, there still existed preparatory work and expertise that could 
quite easily be brought into the process. Hence, the generally time-consuming process of 
developing a new legal framework evolved relatively smoothly, even though it took much 
time for the national government to get momentum in the process.  
London and Stockholm chose two different paths as regards technology. Whereas London 
went for quite a basic technical system based on camera registration, the approach chosen 
in Stockholm built on more advanced technology where camera registration was combined 
with a transponder system that enabled direct debit of the tax from a person’s private 
account. The procurement process of the technical system is in itself a complex story. Of 
main relevance here is the fact that the National Road Administration’s decision in June 2004 
to choose the solution provided by IBM was appealed in court. The jurisdictional process 
caused further delays to the already difficult process and almost ruined the implementation. 
So instead of starting the trial in August 2005, as planned, it was only able to start in the 
beginning of January 2006. However, the improved bus services and extra capacity in the 
subway started to run as planned in August 2005 (Gullberg and Isaksson, 2009).  
It is obvious, in all three cities, that the role of the media is central in the policy process. 
Hence, it is crucial to develop a clear information and communication strategy. In Manches-
ter, there were a number of weaknesses in this respect. Most evident is the fact that there 
was no politician or public authority that shouldered a strong leadership in favour of the 
scheme. The campaign for the congestion charging scheme was initiated by Clean Air Now, 
a network led by a variety of environmental organisations and campaigners and coordinated 
by Manchester Friends of the Earth (Sherriff, 2009). Later on, there was an official ‘yes’ 
campaign for the referendum and, although the leader of Manchester City Council spoke out 
in favour of the plans at times, the extent of clear public/official support for the scheme was 
substantially less than could be observed in the London and Stockholm examples. It also 
appears that the arguments put forward for the ‘yes’ campaign may have been too complex, 
detailed and nuanced for the public to fully appreciate. The expected benefits of the scheme 
for citizens were in general not lifted up clearly, but when discussed, main attention was paid 
on exemptions for certain groups (e.g. the elderly, disabled, the retired), rather than the 
implications of the scheme for the average working person. In contrast, the ‘no’ campaign 
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was able to appeal to basic and emotional instincts, and mobilised quickly with support from 
some of the business community. The media reporting was full of criticism also in London 
and Stockholm, but in both cities there was (in Stockholm a bit later on in the process, but 
still) a clear political leadership that managed to communicate the intention and the benefits 
of the policy packages.  
In Stockholm, where problems with public opposition were greater than in London, the main 
responsibility for public information was eventually shared between the local congestion tax 
secretariat and the National Road Administration (NRA). This was probably important, since 
the NRA was perceived as a much more neutral actor that could not be accused of spreading 
political propaganda (as happened with the local secretariat). In Stockholm, the scientific 
evaluation of the results of the trial started to communicate results already on the first day of 
the trial. This was probably an important part of the communication strategy, since it was a 
way to ensure that the media picture would be built on correct data and not rumours.  
Finally a factor contributing to success in Stockholm was that the project seems highly 
beneficial from a cost-benefit perspective. Net social benefits “recover” investment and start-
up costs in around 4 years (Eliasson, 2009). For London there exist studies showing both a 
net benefit and a net loss (Transport for London, 2003; Prud’homme and Bocarejo, 2005). 
A number of key success factors and barriers in relation to policy formation and 
implementation evolved in the Stockholm example and are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Key success factors and barriers in Urban Congestion Charging (L= London, S= 
Stockholm, M= Manchester) 
Key conditions Success factors Barriers  
Cultural conditions/ 
Public and stakeholder 
acceptance 
Carefully prepared information 
and communication strategies 
(L, S).  
An ambitious round of public 
consultation (L) 
Low public acceptance (L, S, M)  
Weak communication strategy (M) 
Political A national political consensus 
on the need to break away 
from the existing transport 
paradigm (L, M) 
A project champion who 
backed up the congestion 
charging policy and managed 
to created legitimacy (L) 
A political leadership 
developing over time, with a 
network of policy makers and 
experts who worked intensively 
for successful policy 
implementation (S).  
Internal tensions in key political parties 
(S, M).  
Originally no political champion for 
congestion charging (M, S)  
 
Legal/regulatory  An existing legal framework 
that supported this kind of 
initiative (L, M) 
Non-existing legal framework (and to 
develop a new legal framework takes 
time) (S).  
A time-consuming round of appeals to 
court relating to the procurement of the 
technical system (S). 
Organisational/ 
Institutional 
A clear pioneering spirit among 
key professionals involved in 
the preparations (L, S). 
Existing institutional framework 
with clear mandates, roles, 
responsibilities (L) 
Unclear roles and relations between 
the actors and institutions involved (S). 
Knowledge/Information Preparatory work and expert 
knowledge existed and was 
easy to access and bring into 
the process (L, S)  
Underestimation of the extent to which 
a new legal framework would be 
needed (S) 
Technological Technical system worked well 
(L, S) 
The procurement of a technical system 
took time and suffered by the unclear 
roles and responsibilities among key 
institutions (S) 
 
 
3.3 National Heavy Vehicle Fees 
3.3.1 About the case 
There exist today several economic policy instruments aimed at reducing heavy vehicle 
transport on roads and sometimes also promoting a modal shift to rail and sea transport. 
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Examples are the Eurovignette in Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and 
Sweden (Broaddus and Gertz, 2008; Wieland 2005); as well as specific fees introduced in 
Switzerland, Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic (Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung 
ARE, 2010). In addition, in Europe there are several fees covering both heavy vehicles and 
passenger cars on selected parts of the road network. All these initiatives are of interest, but 
in this study we focus on two of them, namely the heavy vehicle fees in Switzerland and 
Germany. The Swiss fee is particularly interesting and relevant for OPTIC, as the fee is 
included in a large policy package of other measures. It was the first distance-related heavy 
vehicle fee introduced in Europe as early as 2001. The main aim of the package was to push 
for a modal shift for freight transport from road to rail and to reduce the number of heavy 
vehicles crossing the Alps. The Swiss policy package includes the following core measures 
(Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE, 2010): 
• A distance-based and emission class-related fee for vehicles above 3.5 tons, the so-
called LSVA, on the entire road network  
• Stepwise increase of weight limits for heavy vehicles from 28 to 40 tons  
• Applying the fee mainly to support funding of new rail infrastructure, including two railway 
tunnels, and to support the cantons 
• A rail reform to improve productivity and competitiveness  
• Support of combined transport. 
The policy making, and to a lesser extent, the implementation process of this Swiss policy 
package form the main focus of the case study.  
In addition, the German heavy vehicle fee package is incorporated in the case study. The 
German example is a more limited policy package that does not involve as many aspects as 
the Swiss package. It was introduced in 2005 and consists of a distance-based and emission 
class-related fee for heavy vehicles above 12 tons driving on the federal highways and some 
secondary segments. The package further includes application of the revenue for investment 
and maintenance of road, rail and inland waterways (Broaddus and Gertz, 2008; Wieland, 
2005), as well as tax reliefs and a subsidy programme for heavy vehicle replacement for 
hauliers giving incentives to invest in low-emission vehicles. Sustainability and modal shift is 
not a core motivation for the German fee, although an important argument for some 
stakeholders (Wieland, 2005). Our empirical basis differs between the two examples, since 
interviews were only carried out for the Swiss example. 
3.3.2 Policy making and implementation process 
The Swiss package 
The Swiss debate on a heavy vehicle fee started in the 1970s, when a commission set up by 
the Government suggested a distance-related heavy vehicle fee, arguing that heavy road 
transport did not cover the infrastructure costs it caused (Balmer 2005). Although a distance-
related fee was not introduced at this point, because the technology was not considered 
ready yet, a flat fee was introduced for heavy vehicles in the beginning of the 1980s, ‘flat’ 
meaning that the fee was not dependent on the distance travelled (Balmer 2005). 
However, the idea of a distance-related fee for heavy vehicles was not dead. Several 
referendums were held during the 1980s, where Swiss citizens could have their say about 
proposals that directly or indirectly involved the introduction of a distance-related fee. 
However, in all cases these proposals were turned down, probably because it was relatively 
shortly after the introduction of the flat fee, and in one instance also because a proposal 
allowed a general capacity to raise road user taxes, i.e. not only taxes on heavy vehicles 
(Balmer 2005). 
Although the Swiss people obviously did not want the distance-related fees, many politicians 
were still very much preoccupied with this issue and continued to work for its implementation 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. During these years, freight transport increased 
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rapidly, in particular in the Alpine region, where the opening of a road tunnel in 1980 
contributed to increased growth (Werder 2004). The politically preferred solution was to 
transfer freight transport from road to rail, mainly by building two new rail links through the 
Alps. This solution was supported by a clear majority of the voters in a referendum in 1992 
(Balmer 2005). 
 
Core features of the Swiss constitutional system 
• Switzerland is a federal state made up of 26 cantons. Power is distributed between the 
confederation and the cantons. 
• At federal level Switzerland has a two-chamber parliament, the United Federal Assembly. 
One chamber is the National Council, which represents the population as a whole, and 
the other chamber is the Council of States, which represents the individual cantons.  
• The Swiss Government comprises seven members of the Federal Council, who are 
elected individually by the United Federal Assembly. The president chairs the meetings of 
the Council. For 50 years the four largest parties in parliament have had seats in the 
Council. 
• By exercising their right to initiate legislation, the electorate can request a popular vote on 
an amendment to the Constitution. If a popular initiative committee manages to collect 
100,000 signatures within an 18-month period from people who are entitled to vote, a 
referendum will be held. Popular initiatives do not originate in Parliament or in the 
Government but come directly from the citizens.  
• If some citizens do not agree with a law from the federal parliament, they can demand a 
referendum, and if 50,000 signatures can be collected within 100 days, the legislation 
must be submitted to a referendum. This vote is called an optional referendum. A 
mandatory referendum must be held e.g. in the case that the Federal Assembly decides 
to carry out a total or partial revision of the Federal Constitution, and changes in the 
constitution are common in Switzerland. 
Sources: www.ch.ch and www.admin.ch. 
 
The referendum in 1992 probably whetted the Government’s appetite for providing the legal 
basis for a heavy vehicle fee too. In parallel to the preparation of a change in the constitution 
allowing a distance-related heavy vehicle fee, a popular initiative for the protection of the 
Alpine region against transit traffic was launched. The core of this initiative was a compulsory 
transfer from road to rail of all freight traffic through the Swiss Alps that had neither its origin 
nor its destination on Swiss territory (Balmer, 2005; Bundesaamt 2010). Although the Swiss 
Government was clearly in favour of a modal shift from road to rail, they rejected the popular 
initiative, because they found it discriminatory and not in accordance with international law. 
Instead, the distance-related heavy vehicle fee was launched as an alternative solution 
(Balmer, 2005). Both the public proposal and the Government proposal were included in a 
referendum by February 1994, and it turned out that the Swiss people accepted the 
compulsory transfer as well as the heavy vehicle fee. Opinion polls showed that 
environmental considerations and solidarity with people living along the transit routes were 
the main arguments in favour of the compulsory transfer from road to rail (Balmer, 2005).  
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The 1994 referendum made the Swiss 
Government start drafting the detailed legi-
slation necessary for the implementation of 
the fee. When the draft was presented to 
NGOs and political parties in parliament, 
the criticism was harsh. The majority of the 
organisations refused it or found that the 
time was not ripe. Five of seven political 
parties, including three of four parties 
represented in the Government, did not 
find it adequate. The arguments forwarded 
against the fee differed. Some criticised the 
level of the fee, the timing and the scientific 
basis for calculation of external costs, and 
the cantons demanded a greater share of 
the revenue of the fee. Hence, it still seem-
ed impossible to realise the suggested 
legislation (Balmer 2005).  
For the introduction of a distance-related 
heavy vehicle fee, a specific On Board Unit 
(OBU), which could register the distance 
travelled, had to be designed. When 
allocation of funding for the development of 
the unit was included in the federal budget 
for 1996, the first chamber of parliament, 
the Council of States, accepted it, while it 
was rejected twice, and then finally after 
impassioned debate accepted in the other 
chamber, the National Council (Balmer 
2005:16). The difficulties of getting parlia-
mentary acceptance for funding of the 
development of the OBU indicated the 
future difficulties for the decision on the heavy vehicle fee. When a new secretary general to 
the Ministry of Transport took over in 1995/1996, the former secretary general advised him 
“to forget the whole project because it would not result in a success” (Werder 2004). 
As it turned out, it was the Swiss country’s relationship to the EU that served as the final 
‘push’ for the introduction of a heavy vehicle fee in Swiss legislation. The reason was that 
back in 1992, the Swiss people had turned down a proposal to join the European Economic 
Area (EEA)5
                                               
 
5 EEA includes a group of nations that are not members of the EU, but participate in the European Single Market 
and are obliged to adopt all EU legislation related to this market, except for the pieces of legislation relating to 
agriculture and fisheries. 
. Standing outside the EEA, the Swiss Government instead aimed at establishing 
bilateral treaties with the EU. For the Swiss Government the ambition of concluding such 
agreements was to improve the framework conditions for Swiss industry in the same way as 
participation in the EEA was anticipated to do. The EU was also interested in bilateral 
treaties, not least to improve the possibilities for transalpine traffic (Balmer, 2005). At the 
time, Switzerland had different traffic regulations which were not favourable to heavy goods 
vehicles. For example, the allowed weight of heavy goods vehicles was limited to 28 tons, 
and as part of the 1994 referendum the Swiss people had further decided to limit the number 
 
Important events during the Swiss 
process 
1985: Introduction of a flat fee for heavy 
goods vehicles. 
1986: Initiative for a distance-related heavy 
vehicle fee rejected at the ballot box. 
1992: Project for two new rail tunnels 
across the Alps accepted. 
 Refusal to join the European 
Economic Area. 
1994: Constitutional bases for a distance-
related heavy vehicle fee accepted in 
referendum. 
 Popular initiative for the protection of 
the Alpine region against transit 
traffic accepted in referendum. 
1998: In referenda the Swiss people 
approves the introduction of the 
distance-related heavy vehicle fee; 
funding of Alpine railway tunnels by 
use of the revenue; and bilateral 
agreements with the EU. 
2001: Introduction of the distance-related 
heavy vehicle fee. 
(Sources: Balmer 2005, Bundesamt für 
Raumentwicklung 2010). 
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of trucks passing through the Alps. Since the opening of the previously mentioned Alpine 
road tunnel in 1980, the importance of restrictions on heavy vehicles had increased (Balmer, 
2005). Therefore, the EU as well as Switzerland aimed to negotiate and conclude bilateral 
treaties.  
As things developed, the heavy vehicle fee eventually proved to be a possible solution in the 
negotiations with the EU. By introducing a heavy vehicle fee at a sufficiently high level, it 
could compensate for the consequences of an increased weight limit and support a modal 
shift from road to rail. Balmer (2005) states that “[p]oliticians in favour of the new fee seized 
the opportunity to put this item on the political agenda again, using it as a bargaining power 
for the negotiations with the EU”. Swiss acceptance of the higher weight limit simultaneously 
was an important prerequisite for making the EU accept a package of treaties anticipated to 
benefit Swiss industry. An EU precondition for negotiations was that the different treaties 
were seen as a package: Either the whole package of all treaties was accepted or the whole 
package was refused (Balmer, 2005). By the end of 1998 a so-called ‘Land Transport 
Agreement’ was concluded between Switzerland and the EU (Bundesamt für Verkehr, 2002), 
including the following measures (Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE, 2010; Rapp and 
Balmer, 2003): 
• The heavy vehicle fee and the levels of the fee 
• A progressive increase in the weight limits 
• Expansion of the network for transalpine traffic, and in particular to construct two railway 
tunnels 
• Liberalisation of market access in road and rail transport and free access to the rail 
network. 
The Ministry of Transport took a number of steps to improve public and stakeholder 
acceptance of the fee. Hence it was agreed that (Balmer 2005): 
• 1/3 of the revenue of the fee should be allocated to the cantons 
• The remaining 2/3 of the revenue should be earmarked for funding two new rail links 
across the Alps 
• The fee should also be related to emissions 
• Combined transport should be subsidised. 
When legislation was submitted to Parliament in 1997 it passed both chambers with clear 
majorities. Soon thereafter, the Swiss Government delegated levying of the fee to the 
Federal Customs Authority (Balmer, 2005). This shift in authority responsible was made 
partly because the Federal Customs Authority was experienced in raising taxes, partly 
because it was convenient that another authority not involved in the policy-making process 
and considered ‘pro-fee’ took responsibility for implementation and the Federal Customs 
Administration was considered a ‘neutral’ partner.  
The implementation process included extensive cooperation between the Customs Authority 
and the hauliers’ organisation. All through the implementation process the focus was on 
simple and proven technological solutions. The collection of the fee started as planned by 
January 1, 2001. According to existing studies “[t]here were practically no problems in 
introducing the fee and the […] system has been running smoothly from the start” (Rapp and 
Balmer, 2003:8). 
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The German package 
The introduction of a heavy vehicle fee in 
Germany was very much motivated by the 
increasing number of foreign trucks using the 
road systems but paying neither vehicle excise 
taxes nor gasoline taxes in Germany. As these 
taxes were the main source for financing road 
infrastructure in Germany and tax levels were 
higher than in many neighbouring countries, this 
situation was seen as a disadvantage to 
German transport companies (Wieland, 2005). 
Other factors were the support of modal split in 
favour of railway and environmental reasons. 
The legal basis for this vehicle fee was created 
with the Eurovignette Directive in 1993 and 
1999. It allowed EU countries to introduce 
national heavy vehicle road charging schemes that are considered to be in accordance with 
the EU principles on the free movement of goods. The main rules laid down here are that 
charging must be non-discriminatory, should be easy to use and fees should be based only 
on infrastructure costs. In subsequent amendments of the directive these rules were further 
differentiated, e.g. extended the calculation basis to include external costs (congestion, noise 
and air pollution) as well. (European Commission, 2011b). These new ammendments also 
included the option of making it mandatory for all member states after a certain period for all 
trucks above 3.5 t. Here an exception was included that member states can raise this limit to 
12 t if they can provide justification for that (e.g. unreasonably high additional operating 
costs). This clause was demanded by Germany and shows that the package must be seen 
on both national and EU level. On the national level the EU directive defines the possible 
scope of a national regulation. Thus, during the formulation and amendments of the EU 
directive national necessities can and must be brought into the discussion process  
The German heavy vehicle toll is calculated based on distance travelled, number of axles 
and the emission class of trucks. The objectives are to finance transportation constructions 
and expand and promote heavy vehicle efficiency. The revenue is applied for investment and 
maintenance of road, rail and inland-waterways (Broaddus and Gertz, 2008). In addition, the 
German government offered domestic hauliers a number of tax reliefs. Among them, vehicle 
taxes were set at the lowest allowable EU level. A subsidy programme for vehicle 
replacement was created, giving incentives to invest in low-emission HGVs. However, the 
plan to provide rebates on fuel tax expenditure, which were to be deductible from toll 
expenses, was later overruled by the European Commission as unfair discrimination against 
foreign haulers. 
The German government adopted the scheme in 1998 as part of an anti-congestion 
programme and it was adopted with surprisingly little resistance from stakeholders. Car 
owners welcomed the toll as a way to reduce growing heavy vehicle traffic on motorways. 
Politically, the toll scheme served multiple policy goals and united disparate interests. At the 
time the German government was ruled by a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the 
Green Party. Environmental groups and the Green Party embraced the toll scheme as a 
remedy for an underpriced public good and as a way to reduce heavy vehicle emissions 
through freight optimisation and modal shift. Industrial and labour interests and the Social 
Democrat Party saw the toll system as a way to create high-tech jobs in Germany and 
increase market share in international freight logistics in the next decade (Wieland, 2005). 
The main reason for the trucking industry not fighting the new toll system was that they saw 
user fees as a way to have foreign hauliers pay their fair share for Germany’s roads. Foreign 
trucks often fuel up just across the border to avoid the high German fuel tax, and for this 
reason (among others), German hauliers felt that they were at a disadvantage when 
Important events during the German 
process 
1998: The government adopts a fee for 
heavy goods vehicles as part of an 
anti-congestion program. 
2002: Toll Collect is chosen as operator. 
2003: Expected launching of the 
scheme, but delays. 
2005: Fee is launched. 
2006: EU Commission overrules German 
rebates on fuel tax expenditures. 
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competing with eastern European firms that benefit from lower costs for labour, fuel and 
vehicle taxes. In addition, the German government included in the package a number of tax 
reliefs and the above mentioned subsidy programme. Another important factor for 
acceptance of the toll was that the media concentrated their reporting about the toll mainly on 
the technical and management problems of Toll Collect and the politicians, not on the 
economic and social issues.  
In 1999, the Federal Department of Transportation started a bidding process and after a 
lengthy selection and negotiation process, a contract was signed with the consortium, Toll 
Collect, in 2002. As operator, Toll Collect handles all aspects of truck toll accounting and 
payments to the German federal government. The contract with Toll Collect called for the toll 
system to be launched in August 2003, but it was delayed for nearly two years. The first 
setback was a legal challenge in the European Courts brought by a rival consortium. Further 
delays were due to technical difficulties in the development process. The main difficulties that 
were encountered related to the On Board Units, which interfered with other on-board 
electronics of the vehicle and which exhibited compatibility problems with radio antennae 
(Wieland, 2005). This led to the cancellation and renegotiation of the contract in 2004, 
resulting in lower fees and higher financial penalties for Toll Collect. Besides extra legal 
costs, the German government lost revenues from phasing out the Eurovignette in 2003, 
allowing heavy vehicles to use Germany’s motorway at no charge for two years (Broaddus 
and Gertz, 2006). In autumn 2004, the Federal government sued the consortium for €3.5bn 
in punitive damages (Knorr et al., 2009). At the time of writing (March 2011) the legal 
arbitration process between the German government and TollCollect was still ongoing. The 
German satellite-based heavy goods vehicles toll was finally introduced in 2005 for all trucks 
using national motorways with a maximum laden weight greater than 12 tons. Ever since the 
system became fully operational, it has worked very smoothly without any major technical 
glitches or service disruptions. In general, revenues have exceeded expectations, although 
the economic downturn has resulted in lower revenues. The number of environmentally 
friendly heavy vehicles has increased, but no changes in modal split from road to rail or 
inland waterway can be discerned (Knorr et al., 2009).  
3.3.3 Analysis  
In the Swiss and German examples, we consider the heavy vehicle fees to be the primary 
measure in the policy package (OPTIC, 2010). The fees generated can be considered 
redistributive, entrepreneur policies, where the advantages benefit the general public, while 
the costs are paid by the domestic and foreign road hauliers. Our typology stipulates that 
policies with this content will often cause political and cultural/public/stakeholder barriers in 
the form of resistance from target groups paying the costs, as well as politicians advocating 
these interests. 
However, in both examples the fee revenue is applied for public works, which in itself can be 
considered distributive policy, as is the German subsidy programme for hauliers. The 
expected tax reduction in Germany can be considered a redistributive, client policy. The 
Swiss package also includes regulatory (liberalising weight limits) and constituent (rail 
reform) elements. Hence, the final policy packages, which include important elements of 
distributive policies and client policies, differ substantially from the primary measure, which in 
both examples could be considered a redistributive, entrepreneur policy, likely to be met by 
severe barriers. 
The Swiss package is established in a very special national setting with particular institutional 
features. The national setting leaves the policy makers with many instruments and possible 
measures. In particular, popular votes and referendums are essential for establishing 
success factors in this example when applied intelligently by the policy makers.  
Both examples are characterised by conflict and bargaining in the policy making process, 
and in the German example also in the implementation process. There are many actors and 
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stakeholders with conflicting interests and goals. This could create barriers, but is handled by 
the policy makers via flexibility in bargaining and compromising, and by extending the policy 
scope and hence providing a package considering the interests of strong actors, in the Swiss 
example e.g. by negotiating with the Alpine Initiative, the EU and the cantons, and in the 
German example by establishing a ‘grand coalition’ with all relevant stakeholders (Wieland, 
2005). The Swiss example is further characterised by temporal relations establishing a 
window of opportunity when the negotiations with the EU launched possibilities for 
introducing the heavy vehicle fee. The window was applied consciously and forcefully by the 
policy makers. The core actors indeed seized “the right moment for pushing through a 
delicate project” (Balmer, 2005), and thus were aware of the importance of timing. 
In these cases of national heavy vehicle fee packages, a number of key barriers and success 
factors manifested, as shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Key success factors and barriers in National Heavy Vehicle Fees (CH = 
Switzerland, DE = Germany). 
Key conditions Success factors Barriers 
Cultural conditions/Public 
and stakeholder 
acceptance 
Flexibility in package design 
during negotiations with various 
partners (DE and CH). 
Highlighting it as a technical 
showcase from which industry will 
benefit (DE) 
Linkage of heavy vehicle fee to 
general ability to tax road use 
causes lack of public 
acceptability early in the process 
(CH) 
Hauliers stress negative side 
effects (CH). 
Political Pioneering spirit by committed 
people who knew each other 
helped set up of the package 
(CH). 
Enlarging the bargaining room by 
incorporating the EU bilateral 
negotiations (CH). 
Being prepared for window of 
opportunity (CH). 
 
Legal/regulatory Popular votes and referenda 
applied intelligently by the policy 
makers (CH) 
 
Legislation not in place in 
advance (CH and DE). 
Choice of Toll Collect taken to 
court by competing bidder (DE) 
Fiscal/financial Making fee revenue pay for 
investments (CH and DE). 
Involvement of industry through 
public-private partnership (DE) 
High administrative costs (DE). 
Technological/technical Smooth implementation with 
known technology (CH). 
Development of complex, new 
technology for immediate full-
scale launch proved more 
problematic than anticipated 
(DE). 
 
3.4 Aviation in the European Emissions Trading System 
3.4.1 About the case 
Demand for air transport has been growing rapidly in recent decades, with average growth 
rates at around 5% per annum. At the same time, reductions in fuel consumption per 
passenger-km travelled have been around 2% per annum. In recent years, it has been the 
fastest growing mode of transport in developed economies and is predicted to remain so for 
the foreseeable future.  
Following the IPCC report Aviation and the Global Atmosphere (IPCC 1999), the climate 
impact of aviation started to receive major attention. The report highlighted, among other 
issues, the effect that emissions of water vapour and nitrogen oxides at high altitude would 
have on climate change. This, together with the forecast increased growth of the industry, 
suggested that something had to be done. However, the international nature of air transport 
meant that international air transport was not included in the Kyoto agreement (Peters and 
Hertwich, 2008). 
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Instead, the policy package covered in this section was the response from the EU to the 
challenge of curbing greenhouse gas emissions from air transport. The package consists of 
four types of elements, each consisting in general of one measure.  
The first element of the package includes the introduction of market-based measures to 
reduce air transport emissions and to internalise the external cost of air transport. In general, 
three such measures exist: fuel taxes, en-route emissions charges and emissions trading. 
Including aviation in the EU Emissions Trading System became the option chosen. 
The second element/measure is to develop CO2 standards for aircraft engines. At present 
only standards for air pollutants exist and these standards apply to the Landing-Take-Off 
Cycle. Work to define and implement this measure is taking place at the ICAO, and the EU 
contributes to this through its membership and involvement in the ICAO.  
A third element of the package is investment in R&D to reduce aircraft emissions through 
improved operation and development of new technologies. For this, the EU Framework 
Programmes (FP) allocate specific funds for research in ‘air transport and the environment’. 
Here the development of an alternative fuel to kerosene is seen as a major opportunity but 
equally a challenge.  
The fourth element relates to infrastructure. The main measure pursued here is the creation 
of a ‘Single European Sky’. This measure aims to ensure that the most efficient (shortest) 
route is used to fly between two airports, minimising unnecessary en-route detours and 
delays due to the present fragmentation of the European air traffic control system.  
While work is underway for the implementation of the full package, the nature of the latter 
three elements described above suggests a very long implementation process, which can 
take years before it leads to meaningful results. On the other hand, pricing measures are 
seen as having the potential to deliver results more quickly. They are also considered to be 
important in ‘signalling’, through the price mechanism, the need to change (current) travel 
behaviour.  
The EU ETS will be expanded from the current scheme that includes ‘heavy industries’ to 
also include air transport from 1 January 2012. All flights inside the EU or to and from the EU 
will be included (European Parliament and the Council, 2008). At first, the number of 
emission permits allocated to airlines will be capped at 97% of average greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2004-2006. Initially only 15% of the allowances will be auctioned. It is note-
worthy that emissions other than CO2 are not included in the scheme. According to Lee et al. 
(2009), water vapour and nitrogen oxides emitted by aviation together have nearly as great a 
climate impact as CO2. 
The main emphasis in this case study is put on the policy formation process and the final 
choice of emissions trading as the primary measure. Research which examined the likely 
effectiveness of including air transport within an emissions trading scheme largely came to 
the conclusion that it is unlikely to be very effective (Mendes and Santos 2008; Vespermann 
and Wald, 2010). 
3.4.2 Policy making and implementation process 
The foundation for the institutional framework which governs international air transport 
services was established in 1944 in what is known as the ‘Chicago Convention’, where the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), an agency of the United Nations, was 
established. At the time of the Chicago Convention, the main concern with respect to the 
newly emerging industry was to develop it and guarantee its survival, given the doubts about 
its economic viability, and therefore it was agreed that air fuel should not be taxed. 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, from which international aviation was exempted, can be 
considered the start date of the process, as it represented the starting point of international 
action to abate climate change. Another initial, and important, milestone is the special IPCC 
 How to manage barriers to formation and implementation                                                      of policy packages in transport 
 
36 
 
(1999) report on air transport contribution to climate change, which highlighted the urgency of 
specifically dealing with air transport given the new scientific evidence on the effect of 
emissions at high altitude and the expectation for rapid growth of the industry.  
Within the negotiations that took place in Kyoto in 1997, a major dispute between the EU and 
US was the former’s call for binding emission reductions compared with the latter’s position 
that a more flexible/softer approach should be adopted in the form of emissions trading. In 
1998, however, the EU changed its position and became open to the idea of emissions 
trading, although in addition and not instead of emission reduction commitments, as the 
European Parliament stated (Buhr, 2008). Following this change in opinion on emissions 
trading, a consultation process was initiated by the EU on the subject. In 2000 a Green 
Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union (European 
Commission, 2000) was published to start a greater debate on the matter.  
In 2000, with the election of George W. Bush as president, the US withdrew from the Kyoto 
Protocol. This could have reduced the interest of the EU in this measure, but the opposite 
happened. The EU began calling for an EU emissions trading scheme that, as the EU 
Environment Commissioner at the time put it, “would be the foundation of a bigger building 
we hope to construct over time, i.e. international emissions trading” (Wallström, 2002 cit. 
Buhr 2008:86). An EU Directive on ETS entered into force in October 2003 and the scheme 
began operation on January 1, 2005. The directive, and subsequently the scheme, covered 
CO2 emissions only from power and heat generation, iron and steel, oil refining, pulp and 
paper, cement and other building materials industries. 
The increased attention on the climate change problem and air transport’s contribution to it 
naturally also attracted the attention of the air transport industry. Through its own channels, 
and especially its involvement in the ICAO, the industry progressed the idea of emissions 
trading. Research sponsored by the International Air Transport Association (IATA, an 
international trade body representing over 200 airlines responsible for more than 90% of 
scheduled international air traffic), which examined aviation and emissions trading, conclu-
ded that it is “likely to be an appropriate tool to meet emission reduction commitments” (Buhr, 
2008:101). More generally, IATA came to the conclusion that the industry is likely to face 
some form of restrictions on its emissions and therefore it should adopt a proactive coherent 
strategy to influence the debate in its favour (Buhr, 2008). The industry support for emissions 
trading was very much in the face of the support, mainly by various European NGOs, for the 
use of taxation as a measure. Taxation, it was expected, would have a much more adverse 
effect on the industry and especially the airlines.  
The debate on the best way for dealing with air transport impact on climate change continued 
in the first half of the new millennium. Increasingly this debate narrowed to a discussion on 
emissions trading, although other options were still often considered. This development was 
much influenced by the UK, and in turn by the UK air transport industry. The UK activity on 
this front was especially important as it was about to assume the EU presidency. In this 
period, an important ‘actor’ was the research consultancy firm CE-Delft, which carried out 
studies on the subject for the EU Commission. At first CE-Delft was asked to study various 
options and concluded that emissions trading is an attractive option (but also pointed out the 
feasibility of two other types of charges). Later, it was asked to study specific ways to include 
air transport in the EU ETS (Buhr, 2008).  
The European Commission initiated a call for input to the stakeholder consultation ‘Reducing 
the Climate Change Impact of Aviation’ held in 2005. Among the respondents the preferred 
policy option was air fuel taxes, followed closely by emissions trading and en-route charges. 
The aviation industry preferred emissions trading, while most other organisations including 
NGOs preferred fuel taxation (Buhr, 2008). In September 2005, the European Commission 
issued a Communication on ‘Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation’ (CEC, 2005) 
and this represents the selection of emissions trading as the choice of market-based 
measure. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union were invited to 
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respond to the communication. From this point the focus shifted to the ‘how’ rather than ‘if’ 
with respect to emissions trading scheme for air transport. A crucial institutional issue was 
the voting rules in the European Council. Any tax would have to be agreed on unanimously 
(Scheuer, 2005). For the option of emissions trading, on the other hand, a qualified majority 
would be sufficient. 
Another action taken to move forward the implementation of the scheme was the 
establishment of a stakeholder group to assist the Commission in designing the chosen 
measure. To prepare for the necessary decisions to be taken, the Commission set up an 
Aviation Working Group that included a wide range of stakeholders, with many representing 
the aviation industry.  
In December 2006 the European Commission presented draft legislation to include aviation 
in the EU ETS. In the summer of 2008 the European Parliament and the Slovenian 
Presidency reached a deal on including aviation in the ETS and finally on 19 November 2008 
the legislation process ended with the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2008).  
3.4.3 Analysis  
This case is characterised by the highly international features of air transport and the 
concomitant difficulties in agreeing on effective policies. The policy formation phase was 
much characterised by bargaining processes. The EU Commission, with some support from 
the energy-intensive industry and NGOs, aimed for measures that would be effective in 
reaching substantial emission reductions compared with a business-as-usual scenario. The 
aviation industry, on the other side, naturally wanted to minimise the cost to its business, 
while at the same time realising that the present position of a total exemption from 
greenhouse gas pricing was untenable.  
Including aviation in the ETS is mainly a redistributive policy and an entrepreneur policy. It is 
generally difficult to get acceptance for such policies. However, in this case, as mentioned, 
there was an apparent need for a more level playing field with regard to e.g. taxation of road 
transport. One might say that ‘benchmarking’ aviation to road transport was used in the 
debate as a lever to make the aviation industry accept some kind of pricing of its emissions. 
There was also a flavour of distributive policy added, by channelling revenues from 
auctioning of emission permits to R&D in aircraft technology and aviation fuels. Conscious 
communication of the climate impact of aviation and public consultations including the 
industry also appear to have contributed to overcome the barriers. 
A key barrier was the voting rules of the European Council, which require unanimous 
decisions on fuel taxation. This appeared to be an insurmountable barrier with regard to the 
option fuel taxation. The consequence was that a less effective policy option, emissions 
trading, was chosen instead. 
Regarding the implementation there might be some difficulties. The inclusion of air transport 
in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme is a complex policy process mainly from a legal 
perspective, given the nature of air transport and the legal/institutional frameworks set to 
control and govern it. These were set and decided as early as 1944 in the Chicago 
Convention with the idea of supporting a young and fragile new industry. The EU Directive 
that includes aviation in the ETS states that all flights departing from and arriving at EU 
airports should be included in the system, regardless of airline origin. This means that there 
is a risk that other countries as ‘third parties’ would object, and actually the US is at present 
suing the EU, claiming that flights to the US cannot be included in the scheme. 
In the case of aviation in ETS, a number of key success factors and barriers were 
manifested, as shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Key success factors and barriers in Aviation in ETS. 
Key conditions Success factors Barriers 
Cultural conditions/ 
public and 
stakeholder 
acceptance 
Benchmarking to taxation of 
emissions in road transport. 
Financing R&D on aircraft and fuels 
by revenues.  
Communicating scientific knowledge 
on aviation and climate change. 
Stakeholder consultations. 
Aviation industry opposed to any 
pricing of emissions. 
 
Legal/ regulatory A less effective policy (emissions 
trading) was chosen instead.  
 
 
The voting rules of the European 
Council, which require unanimous 
decisions on fuel taxation. 
The US is suing the EU, claiming 
flights to the US cannot be included 
in the scheme. (The verdict is still to 
come) 
 
An interesting issue is whether this case can be labelled a success or not. It may be argued 
that it is a success since the industry is being made to take some responsibility for its emiss-
ions and pay for these. Taking this view, the main success factors may be identified as: ex-
tensive, well-prepared consultation and the thorough research conducted. The Commission 
has tried to address the acceptance barriers through extensive ‘explanation’ efforts as well 
‘education’ measures with respect to climate change and the air transport contribution to it.  
On the other hand, there was significant pressure to make aviation pay for its emissions, not 
least when a comparison is made with pricing of road transport. From this point of view, it 
may be argued that the outcome was not a success from a climate perspective, but rather 
among the best possible for the aviation industry. While there is no risk of ‘carbon leakage’6
  
 
for aviation, it will still have the same conditions as industries such as steel and paper and 
pulp, regarding which there is a risk of carbon leakage. It may also be noted that greenhouse 
gases other than CO2 will not be included in the emissions trading system, although for 
aviation other gases, e.g. water vapour and nitrogen oxides, together cause nearly as great a 
climate impact as does CO2 (Lee et al. 2009). 
                                               
 
6 ‘Carbon leakage’ means that an industry moves its business/activities out of the EU to a country 
where CO2-emissions are not priced at all. The risk for carbon leakage is a reason for having a lower 
CO2-tax on stationary industries like steel or paper and pulp that, contrary to aviation, can move their 
businesses out of the EU if their costs become too high. 
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3.5 The EU’s First Railway package 
3.5.1 About the case 
As part of the overall efforts within the EU to create a cohesive, liberalised pan-European 
transport network, initiatives have been taken on the railway side to reduce cross-border 
inefficiencies and enhance interoperability. One such initiative is the First Railway package, 
which is an interesting case since in many ways it seems to define the basis for further 
development of the EU’s railway policy. It was developed as a policy package at the EU 
level, and included, concretely, a range of administrative changes to be implemented for all 
member states. Since it has been in force for several years, it is possible to study barriers to 
implementation over time.  
The First Railway package was initially designed to open the market and improve 
competition among rail operators and open the international rail freight market by 
establishing a general framework for the development of European railways. The package 
formally consists of Directive 2001/12/EC; creating and improving competition among rail 
operators (European Parliament and the Council, 2001a), Directive 2001/13/EC; opening 
freight market, licensing of railways (European Parliament and the Council, 2001b), and 
Directive 2001/14/EC; providing efficient infrastructure capacity (European Parliament and 
the Council, 2001c). The content of the Directives can be summarised as five main 
requirements, applying to all EU member states (Nash and Matthews, 2009): 
1. Separation of the management of infrastructure, freight and passenger services into 
separate divisions, with their own profit and loss accounts and balance sheets. This 
implies establishing separate transport and infrastructure organisational units.  
2. The establishment of a rail regulator, independent of the infrastructure manager and the 
train operators, which deals with appeals in the event of disputes. This implies 
establishing an organisational unit responsible for at least legislative appeals.  
3. The establishment of a performance-based system to incentivise the infrastructure 
manager.  
4. Allocation of train paths and fees for access to the infrastructure in a non-discriminatory 
way. 
5. Requirements on the financial situation of the infrastructure manager; must be in financial 
equilibrium.  
The Directives were passed by the European Parliament in February 2001, and the deadline 
for implementation into national legal frameworks was set to March 15, 2003. In relation to 
the typology presented in Chapter 2, the First Railway package can be expected to be fairly 
‘easy’ to form and implement, since it does not aim to redistribute resources or change the 
allocation of advantages or disadvantages between groups in society. In practice, however, 
the First Railway package still involved considerable challenges for the EU member states, 
since it required a lot of organisational reform affecting the incumbent, employees, etc. The 
implementation involved several difficulties – technical, legislative, administrative, and 
political/ideological – relating to the reaction and involvement of stakeholders. Altogether, the 
result of implementation of the Directives varies a lot across EU member states. Railway 
interoperability is currently understood to be making ‘moderate’ progress in the short to 
medium term (European Railway Agency, 2009). In this section, we use the experiences 
from Denmark and Sweden to illustrate, more concretely, the kind of success factors and 
barriers that characterised the implementation process in these two countries. 
The selection of Denmark and Sweden is motivated by the fact that they were both relatively 
well-prepared for the First Railway package, having implemented major elements of it prior to 
the introduction of the EU regulations. In this sense the ground was paved for successful 
implementation, but there were still barriers along the way. The overall similarities in the 
general cultural and institutional framework are in this case an advantage for the analysis, 
because they make it easier to relate the results from each example to the other. 
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3.5.2 The implementation processes 
Denmark 
In Denmark, major changes in the conditions for railway transport had been made before the 
First Railway package was adopted by the EU Commission in 2001. For instance, Danish 
State Railways was separated into one train operator (DSB) and one infrastructure holder 
(The Danish National Railway Agency, later Rail Net Denmark) back in 1997. DSB was 
turned into an independent public corporation in 1999, and further separation of the DSB was 
carried out in the late 1990s and in 2001, when the goods department, DSB Goods, was 
merged with Railion (now DB Schenker Rail). Legal changes in the late 1990s opened the 
way for tendering and free access to the freight market from 1999, and for passenger 
transport from 2000.  
Denmark implemented the directives of the First Railway package into national law within the 
required schedule (through the Railways Act 155, which came into force in March 2003). 
Considering all the changes that had already been made, the organisational change intro-
duced by the First Railway package was fairly small and comprised only the separation of a 
regulatory unit from the infrastructure holder. Denmark initially decided to meet this require-
ment by establishing one railway authority, the National Rail Authority (today Danish 
Transport Authority), responsible for railway regulation, planning and safety, with an organi-
sational unit functioning as a board of complaints, the Danish Railway Complaints Board. 
The National Rail Authority was established in 2003 as an agency within the Ministry of 
Transport.  
However, even though the formal adjustments had been accomplished early and on time, 
Denmark later received five reasoned opinions from the EU Commission for insufficient 
implementation of the requirements in the First Railway package. Three of these reasoned 
opinions relate to the former Railway Complaints Board for having too weak powers and 
resources, and for not being independent enough to be capable of monitoring competition in 
the rail service market. This led to a decision in 2010 to replace the Railway Complaints 
Board with a new agency, the Danish Rail Regulatory Body, which is independent of the 
Ministry of Transport. From our interviews it is obvious, however, that these organisational 
changes are solely to meet formal EU demands, and will not have any practical significance. 
According to one of our interviewees, the new agency, the Danish Rail Regulatory Body, is 
an organisational arrangement established solely to please the EU Commission. In practice, 
however, it does not have much central function in the Danish railway system, neither before 
nor after the institutional reorganisation of 2010, because Denmark has a system of clear 
and common rules, i.e. concerning rail charges and capacity allocation, indicating that there 
will not be any disputes requiring a Regulatory Body. 
Another implementation deficit pointed out by the EU Commission relates to the issue of 
performance schemes – mentioned in a reasoned opinion from the EU Commission in 2009. 
A performance scheme is in essence a scheme to encourage railway undertakings and the 
infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and improve the performance of the railway 
network. This may include penalties for actions which disrupt the operation of the network, 
compensation for undertakings which suffer from disruption and bonuses that reward better 
than planned performance (Directive 2001/14/EC, Chapter 11). In Denmark, the infrastruc-
ture holder is responsible for collecting infrastructure fees and the development of infrastruc-
ture performance schemes. As it seems, however, performance schemes are generally not 
supported among Danish railway officials. Instead, they express the opinion that all involved 
parties will normally work towards the goal of a well-functioning infrastructure system 
anyway, thus questioning what performance schemes will actually add to railway practice 
apart from more complexity and administration.  
Closely related to this is the issue of low infrastructure charges, which appears to be a main 
impediment to establishing performance schemes for operators in Denmark. According to our 
interviewees, higher infrastructure charges are hard to justify, not least because railway 
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freight transport is already facing hard competition with road freight transport. Furthermore, in 
practice, since the main railway company for passenger transport (DSB) is state-owned and 
subsidised, it all mainly leads to a procedure of shuffling money around within the system. In 
addition, the Danish government has introduced environmental grants (Rail Net Denmark, 
2010) that will partly compensate for the infrastructure charges approved by the EU 
Commission. These different sets of rules imply that while introducing the new rules required 
by the EU Commission, Denmark is also introducing other local arrangements that somewhat 
maintain the old system and continuously lead to conflicts and contradictions with the new 
regulations. 
Denmark has also received a reasoned opinion on infrastructure charges not being related to 
costs, or insufficient verification of whether the market can bear the charges. Denmark 
practices a uniform charging system based on kilometre use, regardless of the size and 
weight of the rolling stock. However, the EU Commission has specified that charges should 
be designed according to the size and weight of the rolling stock. One Danish interviewee 
stated that the main reason why Denmark had not succeeded in establishing a satisfactory 
system for relating infrastructure charges directly to costs was because the Commission itself 
was not able to provide constructive guidelines on how Denmark was supposed to organise 
their charging regime. The Commission merely pointed out shortcomings of the existing 
system. The same interviewee also stated that adjusting the charging system would add 
unnecessary complexity to the system, and that the Danish enthusiasm for implementing a 
new charging regime was minimal.  
In summary, the ambitions to enhance railway interoperability by the requirements in the First 
Railway package have met a range of implementation barriers in Denmark. Barriers mainly 
seem to be related to culture and attitudes within the organisations responsible. Denmark 
has still not established the requested model in all its details.  
Sweden 
Just like Denmark, Sweden had already implemented several major elements of the First 
Railway package before it was introduced by the EU Commission in 2001. The 1988 
Transport Policy Act had comprised a vertical separation of the Swedish State Railways into 
one train operator (SJ) and one infrastructure holder (Swedish Rail Administration, from 2010 
merged with the former Road Administration and named The Swedish Transport 
Administration). This reform, groundbreaking for its time, is generally considered the starting 
point for the deregulation of the Swedish railway sector (Alexandersson and Hulten, 1999). In 
1996, the government implemented deregulation of the rail freight market, and simultan-
eously enlarged the possibilities for the County Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs) to run 
inter-regional passenger services. In 2001, a further separation and corporatisation of SJ 
units was implemented, and competition in the vertical chain (rolling stock maintenance) was 
introduced.  
Hence, Sweden was in several respects well prepared for implementing the First Railway 
package. However, Sweden failed to implement the package by the deadline, and was 
consequently referred to the European Court of Justice together with eight other EU member 
states. The Swedish Railway Act (SFS 2004:519) and the Swedish Rail Regulation (SFS 
2004:526) were eventually approved by Parliament on July 1, 2004. 
Since the Swedish train operator SJ had already been separated from the infrastructure 
holder Swedish Rail Administration, the First Railway package comprised only smaller 
organisational adjustments, in this case the establishment of the Swedish Rail Agency, which 
was formed from a unit administratively linked to the Swedish Rail Administration in 2004, but 
then made into a separate regulatory unit. The issues regarding non-discriminatory access to 
the network dealt with by the Unit linked to the Swedish Rail Agency were transferred and 
incorporated into a new agency. The agency, which also formulates regulations, examines 
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and grants permits and exercises supervision within the field of rail transport, was 
incorporated into the newly-formed Swedish Transport Agency in 2009.  
When it comes to implementation barriers, the interviewees reported that in the beginning, 
the regulatory body faced some challenges in establishing well-functioning procedures and 
practices with the Swedish Rail Administration. Over time, however, the relationship between 
the two seems to have found its form and the troubles with implementing organisational 
reforms appear to have been relatively modest in the Swedish example – mainly related to 
establishing new communicative and cooperative routines. 
Just as in Denmark, however, there has been an issue with the performance schemes. As in 
Denmark, the infrastructure holder is responsible for the collection of infrastructure fees and 
for the development of infrastructure performance schemes. In 2009, Sweden received a 
reasoned opinion from the EU Commission for not having established a satisfactory 
performance scheme. Swedish interviewees identified low infrastructure charges as the main 
impediment to establishing a performance scheme. However, one interviewee did point out 
that Swedish railway charges have increased significantly since the First Railway package 
was introduced, and that train operators have not opposed this increase. Generally, however, 
the Swedish interviewees questioned the need for strict performance schemes in the 
Swedish context, and expressed a concern that such a scheme could affect the relationship 
between the infrastructure manager and train operators in a negative way, by creating a 
more ‘formal’ and ‘suspicious’ dialogue between the parties.  
On January 1, 2010, however, a legislative change of the Swedish Railway Act, introducing a 
performance scheme, came into force. An interim performance scheme was introduced in 
the network statement for 2011 (Trafikverket, 2010), while a permanent performance scheme 
will be introduced in the network statement for 2012. The infrastructure holder is responsible 
for train path allocation. Train path capacity is allocated annually, with a half-year revision. In 
addition, some capacity resource is reserved for ad-hoc allocations, especially relevant for 
freight transport. This arrangement represents an improvement from 2005, when train path 
capacity was allocated biannually in Sweden (Steer Davies Gleave, 2005).  
3.5.3 Analysis 
The First Railway package is a constituent policy, consisting of the establishment of 
institutional changes and adjustments in legal frameworks, etc. Accordingly, it is not an issue 
that one would expect to lead to any strong public reactions. Instead, the barriers are mainly 
related to internal resistance within the organisations affected by the changes. In this section, 
we discuss these barriers and the success factors and/or strategies for enhancing policy 
implementation.  
First of all, however, a short reflection on the way the two countries acted pro-actively and 
thus already implemented several of the more challenging and time-consuming legal and 
organisational reforms required by the First Railway package before the Directives were 
launched. Thus, the immediate requirements of the First Railway package were not that 
great in either of the two countries. The fact that Sweden still missed the first deadline should 
be interpreted in terms of transposition deficit – which is a general and frequently observed 
problem in EU policy, relating to the quite common delays in implementing EU regulations 
into national law (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). This is also confirmed by the Swedish 
interviewees, who suggest that the delay was probably caused by an underestimation of the 
efforts needed for full implementation of the directives by 2003, possibly related to the fact 
that the railway package was ‘old news’ in Sweden, and more pressing issues were receiving 
greater political attention.  
Apart from the transposition deficit, the barriers to implementation that appear in the case of 
the First Railway package are mainly about internal resistance in the organisations affected. 
In both Denmark and Sweden, there was considerable resistance among officials in the 
railway administration. For instance, one Danish interviewee pointed out the paradox that 
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while the main goal of the First Railway package was to market-orientate the railway sector 
and make it more efficient, its means was to establish new institutions, new administrative 
procedures and a general growth in bureaucracy. A Swedish interviewee noted that EU 
railway packages consist of internally conflicting elements. For instance, safety regulations 
are both comprehensive and detailed, and may conflict with the objective of market opening. 
This potential conflict has become more evident as safety regulations are evolving, in parallel 
to increased competition and actor participation. A Danish interviewee summed up the 
content of the EU’s First Railway package by characterising it as a closely attached mixture 
of favourable and unfavourable elements, making the implementation of less favourable 
arrangements, such as the establishment of the independent board of complaints, possible 
by providing favourable features such as liberalisation and modernisation of the sector.  
Regardless of whether some of this criticism of the content of the First Railway package is 
valid, it clearly illustrates the key importance of attitudes among officials and/or professional 
groups in the organisations concerned. The attitudes may of course be related to ideological 
aspects (whether there is support for more market-orientated solutions or not), or budget 
maximising behaviour, but may also be about mere knowledge and information. For instance, 
one of the Swedish interviewees mentioned that the regulations in the directives of the First 
Railway package were, and still are, quite difficult to understand among key professionals in 
the organisation. It was simply difficult to identify the overarching objectives and establish 
fruitful principle discussions with the parties and actors involved. This, in turn, probably also 
influenced the way individuals in the organisations concerned (as well as the political leaders 
responsible) perceived the requirements and their overall motivation to support smooth 
implementation. Too vague a sense of what a policy is about will hamper personal 
engagement and sense of commitment. This can be related to other studies about how to 
enact change in organisations, where norms, attitudes, ‘will to act’, etc. stand out as key 
explanations for successful or failed implementation (Dovlén and Hilding Rydevik, 2008).  
In Sweden, several initiatives have been taken to manage barriers in terms of negative 
attitudes among key professionals. The interviewees described initiatives taken internally to 
highlight and discuss the overall rationale and content of the policy package within the 
organisations involved. For instance, specific committees of people were appointed and 
given the task of examining the content of the policy further and coming back with more 
information about certain key issues, etc. This seems to have been an important part of the 
implementation process and can be perceived as a strategy to develop a body of knowledge, 
and a common sense within the organisation, of what a certain policy is about and how it 
should be understood. This seems to be a fruitful strategy to enhance successful 
implementation. The case of EU’s First Railway package thus generates one important 
lesson: formation and implementation of constituent policies will benefit from having a clear 
idea of common norms, experiences and understandings among key professionals working 
with a certain issue and from the creation of arenas for discussing and building knowledge – 
and thus creating motivation – for a certain issue. 
In the case of the First Railway package, a number of key success factors and barriers were 
manifested, as shown in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Key success factors and barriers in the First Railway Package (DK = Denmark, 
SE = Sweden). 
Key conditions Success factors Barriers 
Institutional/Organisational Initiatives taken to highlight and 
discuss the key features of the 
First Railway package and the 
main reasons behind its content, 
thus raising awareness, motivation 
and commitment among key 
professionals (SE). 
 
Strengthening internal routines for 
assessing the need for time and 
other resources for successful 
implementation on time (SE). 
 
Acceptance problems among key 
professionals in the organisations 
involved (DK and SE). 
 
Transposition deficit due to an 
underestimation of the efforts 
needed for successful 
implementation (SE). 
 
Legal/Regulatory Major elements of the railway 
package were already 
implemented (SE, DK) 
 
Knowledge/Information  Lack of knowledge of what the 
policy was about – the 
fundamental ideas and 
motivations (DK and SE). 
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4 Strategies to manage barriers in policy formation and 
implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
The cases presented in Chapter 3 illustrate that barriers to policy formation and 
implementation tend to vary greatly depending on the basic features of the policy (package) 
and the framework conditions at hand. We note that policies that aim at achieving profound 
changes in the transport system are more likely to confront difficult barriers (for instance 
strong opposition from key stakeholder groups and the wider public) than policies or policy 
packages that primarily aim to e.g. increase operational effectiveness within a certain mode. 
Even though the latter might be difficult to decide and implement, the policy packages that 
aims at more profound changes are often of key relevance in achieving targets. It is thus an 
important task to compile more general experience on how to enhance successful policy 
formation and implementation. As suggested in Chapter 2, policies with regulatory (dealing 
with legislation and sanctions to influence the activities of citizens and companies) or 
redistributive (which imply redistribution of income by taxation) content (Lowi, 1964, 1985) 
tend to be controversial. The same thing can be said for entrepreneurial policies (where 
advantages are spread and disadvantages focused) (Wilson, 1980). A general principle for 
policy formation might thus be to try to add more distributive and/or client policy features to 
policy measures (single or packages) with a fundamentally redistributive, regulatory and/or 
entrepreneur policy content.  
In Chapter 4, we summarise our main conclusions on strategies for managing barriers in the 
formation and implementation process. As stated in Chapter 2, we define a strategy here as 
a conscious and deliberate action that goes beyond doing things “like we have always done” 
or “following established procedures” (Healey, 2007:30).  
Quite a bit of transport literature has analysed success factors and barriers in policy forma-
tion and implementation as exemplified in the inventory in annex 1 of the report. The litera-
ture also but to a more limited extent describes strategies to manage barriers (Andersson & 
Vedung, 2007; May, 2005; Sørensen, 2008; Tholstrup et al, 2005). However strategies are 
usually less elaborated as in this report, and we consider the strategies presented here as 
the main scientific and practical outcome of the report. In the following we refer to existing 
experience when relevant, including other cases described and analysed within the OPTIC 
project (OPTIC, 2011). However, the main source is experience from the case studies in 
Chapter 3. From this material, we extract nine strategies. We try to discuss these in as 
general a way as possible, and to make clear what general barriers and/or difficulties they 
illustrate. Thus, the strategies presented below are intended to be suitable for use in 
managing similar barriers in other situations within transport policy. The main relations of the 
strategies to various barriers are shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Relationships between strategies and barriers 
Strategy Cultural 
conditions/ 
public and 
stakeholder 
acceptance 
Politi-
cal 
Legal/ 
regula-
tory 
Organisa-
tional/Insti-
tutional 
Know-
ledge/ 
Infor-
mation 
Finan-
cial  
Techno-
logical/ 
technical 
1.Combining sticks and 
carrots 
x x    x  
2.Expanding the policy 
scope and developing 
flexibility in negotiations 
x x      
3.Trials – a way to 
create legitimacy and 
acceptance 
x x   x   
4.Communicating 
benefits clearly 
x x   x   
5.Using good examples x x   x   
6.Preparing for windows 
of opportunity 
 x x     
7.Organisational 
responsibility and set-up 
   x    
8.Applying state funding 
to instigate municipal 
investments 
x x  x  x  
9.Selection of 
established or 
innovative technical 
solutions 
      x 
 
4.2 Combining sticks and carrots 
In all four types of case studied, measures that can be expected to encounter resistance 
were combined with other, more popular measures. This reflects the strategy of combining 
sticks and carrots, commonly referred to within transport policy research (Jaensirisak et al, 
2005) and is a key feature in the idea of policy packages. This strategy was central to both 
the heavy vehicle fee package in Switzerland and the congestion charging packages, and it 
involved clearly stating how revenues were returned to the public, which Harrington et al. 
(2001) have identified as a key success factor. The combination of sticks and carrots, and 
the clarity on how revenues would be spent, served as a key success factor for creating 
acceptance in policy formation in these two cases, but for the congestion charging packages 
it also had some influence in the implementation processes. By applying this strategy, the 
redistributive elements in the congestion charging schemes were made more acceptable, 
since travellers got something back, either in terms of improved bus services and other 
public transport (as in all three congestion charging cases), or in new road infrastructure (as 
in the permanent congestion charging scheme in Stockholm). This strategy also indicates a 
way of overcoming financial barriers by establishing of policy packages including pricing 
mechanisms, where the revenue is applied for funding of investments. This was the situation 
in the examples of the Swiss and German heavy vehicle fee packages as well as the 
congestion charging packages in Stockholm and London. In all these examples the revenue 
from applying a pricing instrument is used to fund investments. It should, however, be noted 
that there is a discrepancy between improvements actually occurring before the decisions is 
taken and such that are promised to happen after the decision. The Stockholm case, 
although providing new bus-lines prior to the decision, also shows that it is easy to later on 
change the promised use of revenues (in this case from public transport to road 
investments).   
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Although to a lesser extent, a combination of sticks and carrots also appears in other cases. 
For instance in the case with aviation in ETS, the revenues raised when auctioning emission 
rights for aviation will be used to fund research and development in aircraft technology and 
alternative aviation fuels. This will support the aviation industry with new knowledge, which 
makes the policy package more favourable for them and thus might reduce the possible 
opposition from their side. 
Another thing worth noting is that in both London and Stockholm, the ‘carrots’ in terms of 
improved public transport was initiated a few months before the new charge/tax started to be 
levied. In Stockholm, this had not been planned in advance but was a consequence of the 
appealed procurement decision, which caused further delays to the introduction of the tax. In 
both examples however, introducing the carrots before the sticks seemed to work fairly well 
and meant, concretely, that it was easy for people to start to adjust their travel routines well 
before the introduction of the new charge/tax. 
4.3 Expanding the policy scope and developing flexibility in 
negotiations 
Actor- and stakeholder barriers were most prominent in the cases of Heavy vehicle fees, 
Congestion charging and Aviation in ETS. From these cases we learn that an important 
strategy for managing these kinds of barriers may be to consciously expand the policy scope 
and/or to develop flexible approaches in negotiations with stakeholders. This is similar to 
what Tholstrup et al. (2005) have termed “hitch-hiking” – referring to the way in which less 
popular issues (objectives + measures) might sometimes hitch-hike with more popular 
issues, in their example illustrated with CO2-reduction initiatives being married together with 
traffic safety, noise or air pollution policies. 
The strategy to expand the policy scope or to develop high flexibility around details in the 
policy design may be operationalised in somewhat different ways as illustrated in the cases. 
In the London and Stockholm examples there was a clearly flexible approach towards details 
in the congestion charging schemes, which allowed policy makers to negotiate and make 
exemptions for certain vehicle categories and other adjustments to increase acceptance from 
stakeholders and the public. In London, extensive public and stakeholder consultation was a 
key process to identify and respond to concerns from the public and specific actors and 
stakeholders. For instance, Transport for London (TfL) made early efforts to engage with the 
business community and get them ‘on board’ from the beginning (Banister, 2002). In 
Stockholm, as in London, a number of adjustments were made in the concrete scheme 
design. The Swiss example shows openness in negotiations towards the cantons. Moreover, 
the Swiss heavy vehicle fee package provides another interesting example. Here the policy 
scope was enlarged to even comprise a major non-transport issue when framework 
conditions for Swiss industry vis-à-vis the EU were introduced into the negotiation process. 
This appeared to be a key factor for the eventual success of the package. 
It is worth noting the trade-off between expanding the policy scope and keeping a clear and 
communicative basic rationale of the policy package in question. Addressing too many 
different issues at a time may ultimately lead to new problems in both the policy formation 
and implementation phase. Similarly, several writers within the road pricing literature have 
pointed out the risk of a too flexible approach around details resulting in a watered- down 
policy (Banister, 2004; Isaksson and Richardson, 2009). In contrast, Langmyhr and Sager 
(1997) emphasise the overall value of getting a certain policy in place, and that this some-
times means that “a crude road pricing scheme may be better than no scheme”. Referring to 
the common tendency for acceptance for controversial policies to increase after 
implementation, their argument is that once a “crude” system is in place, it may be adjusted 
to increased effectiveness and goal-fulfilment. The most important factor, however, is to get it 
in place.  
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4.4 Trials – a way to create legitimacy and acceptance 
Trials have previously been pointed out as an interesting and promising approach for 
breaking deadlock situations and generating concrete experiences from controversial policies 
(Andersson and Vedung 2007). In the Stockholm example, the trial was in itself a central 
feature that enabled agreement to be reached at all. Then, as a response to the problems in 
relation to legitimacy the strategy that was developed was to combine the trial with a public 
referendum, held when the trial had finished. The strategy we identify here is thus the 
trial+referendum approach, where the basic rationale is to first force people to get concrete 
experience of how a certain policy will work and then, as a second step, allow them to vote 
yes or no to it.  
In other words, the referendum that was held in Stockholm was not at all the same as the 
referendum that was held in Manchester. In the latter case too, the idea to hold a referendum 
came up in response to a difficult political situation. However, the referendum was not 
combined with any trial but held before a planned policy implementation and thus in 
Manchester, the referendum led to a no. 
Several things should be noted here. First of all, referendums are always risky. It is probably 
never a good idea to arrange a referendum in advance of a planned implementation of 
redistributive policies affecting large population groups, simply because it will in most cases 
lead to a no. However, a referendum may sometimes be a key measure to break a political 
deadlock. If so, the combination of a trial+referendum seems to be a promising strategy. In 
the case of Stockholm, it was a way to manage the legitimacy issue and to increase accep-
tance both in the policy formation phase and in the implementation phase. It was also an 
effective strategy for meeting criticism along the way: political leaders in Stockholm could 
effectively disarm most of the opposition before the implementation by referring to the 
upcoming referendum. 
4.5 Communicating benefits clearly 
The necessity of developing a dialogue with those opposing a policy or policy package has 
been suggested in other research reports on policy implementation (Andersson and Vedung, 
2007, Sørensen, 2008). Communicative and participatory strategies are essential as part of 
the policy implementation process and were applied in the cases of Heavy vehicle fees, 
Aviation in ETS, and – most evidently – in the Urban Congestion Charging case. In the Swiss 
political system of direct democracy the government has to lead a permanent process with 
the population and an expanded participatory process with all stakeholders. Otherwise the 
government will not succeed in the final popular vote. As explained in the example of the 
Swiss heavy vehicle fee more popular votes took place, and preparation of the communi-
cation related to these votes had to start years before the votes took place. As regard the 
Congestion charging case, there are various aspects that are worth mentioning here, for 
instance the broad consultation process that served as a clear input to the London scheme 
design. In both London and Stockholm, there were clear information strategies, which 
involved a profound and professional communication of the results. The Manchester example 
differs – here it seemed difficult for the city to initiate any clear information about how the 
system would work and the arguments put forward for the scheme were probably too 
complex, detailed and nuanced. It has been argued that many people probably did not know 
how the system would work for the average person.  
In terms of communication, it is interesting to note that the Swedish National Road 
Administration (SNRA) had a key position in informing the public of how the Stockholm 
congestion tax would work during the trial. The SNRA got its formal role confirmed at a very 
late stage in the implementation process and was thus not associated with being ‘for’ or 
‘against’ the trial, but was perceived as a ‘neutral’ partner. The way which it was able to 
initiate the communication and information campaign in a neutral way made parts of the 
information task easier. In contrast, the parallel information campaign initiated by the City of 
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Stockholm was met with much more scepticism among the public. Thus, it is probably a good 
idea to try to identify an actor that may be perceived as neutral, especially in cases when 
public acceptance and trust are critical. 
Just as the SNRA was applied as a ‘neutral’ partner in the implementation phase in the 
Stockholm example, the Swiss Government delegated levying of the fee to the Federal 
Customs Authority. It was also considered a neutral partner, not for or against the heavy 
vehicle fee, and thus could enter smoothly into necessary and extensive cooperation with the 
hauliers’ organisation, and thereby integrate this interest organisation into the implementation 
process. 
In the case of Aviation in ETS barriers were addressed partly by communicating scientific 
knowledge with respect to climate change and air transport’s contribution to it. Stakeholder 
consultations were used and a stakeholder reference group, the Aviation Working Group, 
was set up to assist the Commission in designing the final policy. 
In some cases, there might also be a need for internal communication strategies, aimed at 
managing potential barriers within the organisation or institution where implementation is 
supposed to happen. This was illustrated clearly in the case of the First Railway package. As 
stated in the Swedish example, the First Railway package was perceived as quite advanced 
and detailed among professionals working in the key public institutions affected by the new 
policy. The strategy to inform and educate professional groups concerned about the core 
content and key ambitions of the policy package was probably decisive for generating the 
motivation and commitment required to develop a successful implementation process. 
Internal communication strategies are of key importance especially when constituent 
policy/ies are to be formed and implemented, because those policies sometimes demand 
quite radical adjustments of routines, norms and frameworks in existing organisations. It is 
important to note that internal communication strategies need to build on insights about the 
common norms, experiences, and understandings that motivate relevant professional groups 
in their daily work. 
4.6 Using good examples 
Modelled forecasts of the effects of a certain policy are potentially important, but it might be 
even more persuasive to present concrete experiences from existing cases of policy 
implementation. Congestion charging in London is perhaps the most convincing example 
here, since it has obviously inspired a number of cities all over the world to consider 
something similar. For instance, the London example was important for the way things 
developed in Stockholm. The media reporting of the positive outcome in London served as a 
vitamin injection to the then quite difficult policy process in Stockholm. It appears that 
Stockholm has in turn inspired Gothenburg, which has now decided to introduce congestion 
charging as well. But London (and other cities) has also made use of earlier experiences of 
congestion charging, e.g. early congestion charging scheme used in Singapore since 1975.  
In this context it is interesting to note that what is a good example is not always evident, like 
in the case of Aviation in ETS. Here, a strong argument for making aviation pay for its 
emissions is that road transport (and rail transport) already pays for its emissions. This can 
be seen as a ‘benchmarking’ or referring to a (comparatively) good example with regard to 
pricing of emissions. However, as the policy process unfolded in this case aviation will pay 
more than before (when no CO2-tax at all was levied) but considerably less than road 
transport do, at least in the short term. If considered as a success, with regard to climate 
targets, aviation may be used as a good example for future taxation/charges of sea transport. 
If on the other hand Aviation in the ETS is not considered a success and that this outcome 
was among the best possible for aviation industry as such, then the example might still be 
used, but possibly in this case as a benchmark by the maritime industry to avoid pricing of 
CO2 at the levels that road transport face.  
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4.7 Preparing for windows of opportunity 
Politics is often characterised by complex processes, from time to time involving totally 
unexpected developments and radical shifts in policy agenda. It is probably impossible to 
have a plan for all possible opportunities that may develop over time in a political process. 
Sometimes, windows of opportunity may open up all of a sudden. This was what happened 
in Switzerland, where a window of opportunity opened up for a relatively short while when the 
negotiations with the EU allowed possibilities for introducing the heavy vehicle fee. Similarly, 
in Sweden, after the election in September 2002, the Green Party suddenly held the balance 
of power in all three policy arenas (nationally as well locally and regionally in Stockholm). 
This allowed them to push through the congestion charging trial. Previous research within 
OPTIC has revealed similar windows of opportunity for example in the design of a Danish 
national scheme for transport and environment (OPTIC, 2011), as has earlier research within 
the field (Sørensen, 2008). 
The exact outcome of a window of opportunity is always a matter of timing and political skills, 
in combination with a range of unpredictable and variable factors that affect the policies that 
may or may not be possible and not possible to go for. A possible strategy, which was 
applied deliberately in the Swiss example and to some extent in congestion charging in 
Stockholm was for key actors to build knowledge, to maintain competence and expertise and 
to prepare decision support which could be successfully ‘pulled out of the drawer’ (OPTIC, 
2011) at the right moment. Thus, long-term commitment, patience and perseverance are 
core qualifications. Other research has similarly stressed the importance of continuously 
mapping the need for initiatives and preparing status reports to the political level, thereby 
keeping an issue on the political agenda and increasing the chance of solutions and 
initiatives being applied when a window of opportunity opens (Sørensen, 2008).  
Likewise, it is important to be proactive with respect to regulations and legal issues that can 
take years to implement. For instance, in the case of Aviation in ETS, the European 
Commission recommended back in 1996 that aviation fuel should be taxed “as soon as the 
legal situation allows the community to levy such a tax on all carriers…” (Bhur, 2008: 96). 
This case illustrates that there may sometimes be a need to start changing the legal 
frameworks even if a decision on implementing a tax has still not been taken and will 
probably take years to come. 
4.8 Organisational responsibility and set-up 
All organisations consist of procedures, routines and understandings, which might make 
them difficult to change. When aiming to introduce new policy, this can constitute barriers in 
both the policy formation and implementation stage. For that reason strategic considerations 
to the organisational set-up are crucial. The case-studies reveal various ways to handle this 
issue. 
Although only a newly established organisation in 2000, Transport for London (TfL) gained 
most of its functions from its predecessor London Regional Transport, and in that sense it 
was an existing organisation that had responsibility for the congestion charging package 
when introduced in 2003, but managed to handle it. The Swiss experiences with the heavy 
vehicle fee package illustrate that the Ministry of Transport was indeed working for this 
package including the new policy of a distance related heavy vehicle fee.  
However, in some situations it might be wise to involve different organisations at different 
stages of the policy making and implementation process. This strategy was consciously 
applied during the process of the Swiss heavy vehicle fee package and partly also in the 
Stockholm congestion charging trial. In both examples there was a shift in responsibilities 
when policy making was finished and implementation activities began.  
In the Swiss example, levying of the fee was delegated to the Federal Customs Authority, a 
shift undertaken partly because this authority was experienced in raising taxes and their 
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competence within this field could be applied, and partly because a shift to a ‘neutral’ 
authority made it easier to establish cooperation on the implementation of practical and 
technical issues with organisations opposing the fee. In the Stockholm example a similar 
approach was applied. While policy making was prepared in a relatively small and municipal 
congestion charging secretariat, implementation of the fee was, and is, the responsibility of 
the ‘neutral’, national Swedish Road Administration.  
However, the application of existing organisations for new objectives and policies might not 
be easy, because new ideas might be repelled or decoupled (Røvik, 1998). If that is 
experienced or expected in advance, it might be wise to establish new organisations. The 
Stockholm example illustrates the potential key role of a new administrative unit for imple-
menting unconventional policy measures. Compared with TfL, the Stockholm congestion 
charging secretariat was a very small office. This is interesting since it illustrates that the 
most important aspect might not be the number of people or resources, but instead the key 
aspect of having an administrative unit working directly under the mayor and with a clear 
mandate. One of the main features of a very small secretariat was that it allowed a break 
from established procedures, routines and mindsets that may rule existing administrative 
units. 
The EU First Railway package also provides some input in relation to this. As mentioned in 
section 4.5, the success of internal communication within the organisations that are mainly 
responsible for the implementation is dependent upon having good insights into the norms, 
values and understandings that motivate key professionals. In other words, it is important to 
acknowledge the decisive role of professional norms as part of the organisational arena. 
4.9 Applying state funding to instigate municipal investments  
We previously stressed that jurisdictional levels might constitute different institutional 
conditions for policy formation and implementation, and we emphasised that lack of funding 
might constitute a severe barrier at the local level. Thus, from a national perspective, there 
are various ways in which the state may instigate municipalities and other local authorities to 
develop policies in order to achieve national policy objectives. These have been applied in 
many different countries and contexts and have also been evaluated to some extent. For 
instance the Danish ‘Government Transport and Environment Scheme’ (OPTIC, 2011) 
subsidised up to 50% of projects that would help municipalities implement local transport and 
environment action plans. The scheme was evaluated in 1998, and the evaluation was 
reasonably positive, stating that the scheme “has reached its goals within a number of areas, 
while other areas still cannot be described as satisfactory” (PLS Consult and Flyvbjerg, 1998: 
7-17). A similar scheme has been applied (and evaluated) in Norway (Norconsult and 
Urbanet Analyse, 2007). In addition a study on road noise abatement in Nordic municipalities 
stressed the importance of financial state contributions being available for municipal activities 
in the field, particularly in initial phases of new noise abatement schemes (Sørensen 2008: 
8). 
Among the case studies examined in this report, a similar approach is manifest in the 
Manchester example of congestion charging. Through the state ‘Transport Innovation Fund’ 
(TIF), the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) was to receive £3bn in 
order to implement a comprehensive and coherent anti-congestion strategy. Although the 
entire package in Manchester was abandoned due to opposition to the anti-congestion 
strategy, the Danish and Norwegian cases show that the state can make local authorities 
change investment policy if motivated by the possibility of achieving state funding. However, 
the Manchester example illustrates the downside of this strategy: if congestion charging had 
not been a requirement for state funding in that case, Manchester could perhaps by now 
have implemented some other beneficial policies, albeit probably not as effective as 
congestion charging. 
 How to manage barriers to formation and implementation                                                      of policy packages in transport 
 
52 
 
4.10 Selection of established or innovative technical solutions 
When the Swiss heavy vehicle fee package was implemented a deliberate strategy was to 
apply a simple and proven technological solution for levying the fee. In Switzerland two 
systems were developed to levy the fee, one for users equipped with an On Board Unit 
(mandatory for domestic vehicles) and one for users without such a unit (most foreign 
vehicles). Both systems are very simple. The key element for measuring the distance is the 
tachograph, which is mandatory in all commercial vehicles throughout Europe. The system 
for users equipped with an On Board Unit relies on technology that has long been used for 
electronic fee collection, while the system for vehicles without this unit is also very practical 
(Balmer, 2005). 
A similar strategy was applied in London in the early phase of introducing congestion 
charging. Given the high political risk involved in the scheme, Transport for London 
consciously opted to employ relatively simple technology in the early phase, thereby serving 
to lessen the overall likelihood of package failure. Hence, these two examples point to a 
strategy of using simple, proven and reliable technology, when politically risky policy 
packages as well as single measures are to be implemented. This is contrary to the German 
example, where the implementation process suffered from severe delays due to application 
of high-tech solutions chosen for establishing technological leadership for German 
companies. 
4.11 Concluding reflections on transferability and generality 
The strategies presented in this chapter are based mainly on the concrete experiences from 
the cases presented in Chapter 3. Even though these comprised a limited empirical material, 
we have been able to identify general features and more precise strategies to enhance the 
possibilities for successful policy formation and implementation. This may serve as advice for 
politicians, officials or other key actors engaged in transport policy development. Further-
more, since most of the strategies refer to common barriers to policy formation and imple-
mentation, irrespective of the specific transport issue at hand, we believe that they can be 
applied to other modes of transport too. Exactly how the strategies would be applied depend 
on the specific case and the situation at hand, including actors involved and, not least, the 
framework conditions. The strategies can be applied and transferred to other contexts to 
different degree, hence by copying, by using as a sort of standard, by combing different 
strategies or by using them as inspiration (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). 
It is difficult to judge whether the strategies proposed here are viable for most EU countries. 
Some strategies seem to be rather universal. For instance what we suggest in terms of the 
strategies Combining sticks and carrots, Expanding the policy scope, Communicating 
benefits of policies clearly and Using good examples appear in principle to be transferable to 
most national contexts. These strategies are all about enhancing acceptance in the policy 
formation phase. However, the public support for pursuing a specific policy objective (e.g. 
reducing GHG emissions) may still vary between different countries, as does the strength of 
various stakeholder groups. Differences in other framework conditions (including power 
structures, social norms, public attitudes, legislative and institutional frameworks, etc.) may 
also affect transferability of strategies between countries (Jones 1998; Schade 2003). 
Some strategies are more dependent on specific legislative, organisational or institutional 
settings in countries of the EU. Here a wider investigation would be needed in order to 
identify relevant similarities and differences across the EU-countries. Further studies within 
this area will be carried out within deliverable 6 of the OPTIC-project.  
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5 Barrier management in the policy packaging process 
5.1 Introduction 
This report focuses on how to manage barriers in a successful policy packaging process. In 
this section we discuss how barrier management is related to the overall subject of OPTIC, 
namely to develop methodologies for the design and implementation of holistic policy 
packages in transport. The key issue is how the findings of this report might be integrated 
into the policy packaging process/framework. As outlined in Deliverable 1 of the OPTIC 
project (OPTIC, 2010), the stages in Figure 5.1 can be regarded as the core of a successful 
policy packaging process. It should be noted that there may well be a need for one or several 
iterative loops: 
1. Identification of objectives and target setting 
2. Inventory of measures. Selection of primary measure(s). 
3. Assessment with regard to: 
  - Effectiveness 
  - Efficiency 
  - Acceptance  
  - Feasibility 
4. If necessary, adjustment of package, e.g. by adding measure(s) or adjusting intensity of 
measures. Then new assessment in stage 3.  
5. Implementation 
Figure 5.1: Core stages in the policy packaging process according to the OPTIC framework 
Stages 1-4 refer to policy formation while stage 5 is implementation of policies. These stages 
should be considered an indicative framework. As can be suspected, the analysis of barriers 
may not be treated separately from the rest of the policy packaging process. Managing 
barriers to acceptance and feasibility may for instance involve conflicts with effectiveness 
(target achievement) or economic efficiency. The strategy to manage barriers, or combina-
tion of strategies, that is suitable in each case is also greatly dependent on conditions 
external to the actors in the policy process.  
5.2 The role of strategies to manage barriers in the policy packaging 
process 
Strategies to manage barriers may be used both in the policy formation phase and in the 
implementation phase. In the policy formation phase they are often necessitated by 
acceptance barriers relating to political majorities, which in turn depend on lacking 
acceptance of stakeholders and/or the public. In the assessment (stage 3 above) of single 
policies or policy packages potential barriers need to be identified. This is a difficult task 
since no comprehensive procedures/criteria to detect barriers exist, and the accompanying 
uncertainty needs to be acknowledged. This holds for both present societal conditions and 
the future development of e.g. political majorities, scientific knowledge and technology. 
However, the typologies developed in Chapter 2 may be used for an initial identification of 
policies that have a high risk of not getting accepted (stage 2 in Figure 5.1). In particular 
redistributive policies (which entail redistribution of income by taxation) or entrepreneur 
policies (which entail spread advantages and focused disadvantages) are among such high-
risk policies. If a proposed policy can be assumed to encounter substantial barriers, it may be 
considered whether one or a couple of the strategies outlined in Chapter 4 may be applied to 
manage the barrier. In some situations the strategies may be used to accomplish adjustment 
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of the policy package (stage 4 above) in a way that does not (significantly) conflict with the 
other criteria for a successful policy package (effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility). 
Another possible outcome is that barriers may be managed, but only at the expense of a 
relaxation of the effectiveness and/or the efficiency of the package. Whether these trade-offs 
are deemed satisfactory or not need to be discussed in each case. As empirical evidence 
from literature and the cases show, such outcomes do not appear to be rare. In sections 5.3 
and 5.4 we discuss some potential conflicts between managing barriers and other criteria 
(mainly effectiveness and economic efficiency) in the policy formation phase. An interesting 
issue concerns what effects short-term strategies to manage barriers may have on the longer 
term development paths and the achievement of long-term targets (e.g. climate targets for 
2050). This issue is related to Deliverable 3 and is discussed briefly in section 5.5. Yet 
another possible outcome of the barrier assessment may be that barriers are not possible to 
manage at all, perhaps due to external conditions which key actors may not influence suffi-
ciently. In this case either a new primary measure needs to be selected or the objective has 
to be dropped. However, since conditions regarding e.g. scientific knowledge, technological 
options and political majorities change continuously, in this case the longer term strategy of 
preparing for a window of opportunity still remains (strategy 6 in Chapter 4). 
Regarding the implementation a first assessment of projected barriers is carried out in the 
policy formation phase. It is worthwhile noting that this may occur several years before 
implementation actually starts. However, it is important to initiate projected necessary chang-
es to legal frameworks or institutional structures at an early stage. Due to the fact that 
uncertainty increases rapidly when the time horizon is prolonged, it may be beneficial to 
analyse different scenarios. 
5.3 Barriers to what target? – The trade-off between effectiveness and 
acceptance  
The cases analysed in Chapter 3 indicate that conflicts between effectiveness (target 
achievement) and acceptance of policies are a frequent feature in practical policy making. 
Although the cases analysed in chapter 3 are chosen partly because they are considered 
successes, they are still not without conflicts. In the Stockholm package ‘green cars’ (mainly 
ethanol cars) were exempted from charges. The reason for this seems to have been a 
combination of a will to enhance acceptance among car drivers and a will to simultaneously 
stimulate sales of green cars. These exemptions reduced main target achievement, which 
was to reduce congestion. It was also proposed in the policy formation phase that charges, 
although lower, should be levied on an alternative road, Essingeleden, which was otherwise 
at risk of becoming even more congested when the scheme started. However, this was not 
considered politically feasible because of a perceived lack of public acceptance.  
In this context it is important to ask this question: In relation to what target does a certain 
barrier, or success factor, exist? For instance, a target regarding greenhouse gas emissions 
that are confined to a certain sector (e.g. transport) and a certain geographical area (e.g. a 
city or a country) may not be consistent with the overall EU-target for all sectors. Further-
more, there may often be a discrepancy – possibly caused by the high inertia in the policy 
process – between on the one hand the current quantitative targets of countries and the EU, 
and on the other hand what recent scientific evidence indicate is necessary to keep global 
warming below 2 degrees.  
Strong stakeholders in many cases oppose policies that are effective in reaching the more 
demanding overarching targets, while policies only reaching less ambitious targets are likely 
to face less fierce opposition. This means that the value of a “success factor” must be judged 
against the target used in that specific case. Factors leading to “success” in relation to less 
demanding targets may not necessarily be applicable when more demanding targets are to 
be met. The case of Aviation in ETS illustrates this. If the benchmark is taken as the previous 
state regarding aviation – no climate taxes at all – then it may be regarded as a success. If, 
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on the other hand the comparison is made to what road transport currently pays for its 
emissions, then it may scarcely be labelled a success, at least not in the short term. How this 
case might be judged from a long-term perspective is discussed in section 5.5. 
5.4 Other conflicts between barrier management and other criteria  
Strategies to manage barriers to acceptance may also conflict with economic efficiency and 
even in some cases feasibility. According to Wilson (1980), whether advantages and 
disadvantages of a policy (package) are spread or focused greatly affects the likelihood of 
acceptance. Most acceptable are policies which yield focused advantages but spread 
disadvantages, because those getting clear benefits will mobilise while those getting the 
insignificant disadvantages will not care. Thus, a strategy to increase acceptance may be to 
make advantages focused rather than spread or to make disadvantages spread rather than 
focused (or both). This strategy was used in the congestion charging cases in London and 
Stockholm, as well as in the heavy-vehicle fee in Switzerland, where 2/3 of revenues were 
used to finance two specified railway tunnels. This kind of ‘earmarking’ of revenues is, how-
ever, not optimal for economic efficiency, and many economists would prefer that revenues 
were channelled to the general public budget. Therefore the sometimes substantial benefits 
of getting acceptance for a specific policy need to be weighed against a somewhat reduced 
economic efficiency. 
Although probably less important, barrier management may also conflict with (technical) 
feasibility. The technical solutions for congestion charging in Stockholm (and even more for 
London) were not the most advanced. This was probably a successful strategy since the 
available time for implementation was limited in Stockholm (it was likely that the political 
majority would shift in the next election). However, this technology choice also had some 
drawbacks. An argument put forward in the public debate in Stockholm was; Why should 
people driving inside the toll ring not pay anything? A more advanced GPS-based system 
that could continuously differentiate geographically and over time might have been 
considered fairer in this respect, and could thus have increased acceptance, in a case where 
there would be sufficient time available for a more time-consuming implementation. 
5.5 Barrier management and the long term perspective 
Policy packages do not only need to be assessed with regard to their effectiveness to reach 
short-term, intermediate targets. It is also crucial that they simultaneously serve to enable 
rather than obstruct development paths leading to achievement of long-term targets. This 
field was explored in Deliverable 3. A policy package therefore: 
1. Need to enable, rather than obstruct, long term targets given present best knowledge. 
2. But should also be sufficiently flexible/robust to cope with different external 
developments and new knowledge on necessary target levels. 
There is therefore a need in the policy packaging process to check whether barrier 
management may compromise development paths leading to long-term target achievement. 
Investing in new transport infrastructure lead to lock-ins, which may be positive or negative 
with respect to a certain target. The Swiss heavy vehicle fee package, which earmarked a 
large share of revenues to railway tunnels, may be regarded as leading to a positive lock-in 
situation with regard to e.g. mitigating climate change. The German case on the other hand, 
although possibly alleviating some congestion in the medium term, may lead to a largely 
negative lock-in with regard to long term targets, if the bulk of revenues are used to increase 
investments in new road capacity. In Stockholm, the revenue from congestion charging was 
initially intended to be used for improved public transport. However, the new government in 
Stockholm (which was opposed to congestion charging) changed this and decided that the 
revenue should instead be used for building roads. This was a means to please their 
constituency. These cases show that there is a risk of ending up in a detrimental path 
dependency caused by secondary measures applied to achieve acceptance of the primary 
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measure. An aspect adding to the complexity in the assessment of these cases is that it is 
rather difficult to know how a reference scenario without the policies considered would 
unfold. It might be that the roads in these cases would have been built anyway, albeit at a 
later time. 
In some cases it may be argued that the introduction of a new pricing system (e.g. a 
congestion charging scheme) in itself represents a success in a long-term perspective, even 
if the short-term charges applied are modest, due to efforts to get the policy accepted at all. 
This is certainly true in many cases, since there may be a threshold effect associated with 
the introduction of such systems. However, in some cases the opposite might be claimed. 
Although the inclusion of aviation in the ETS means that aviation will pay more for emissions 
than before (when no charges whatsoever were levied), there seems to be a risk that 
aviation, maybe for decades, will be locked into a system in which it pays much less for 
similar emissions than road transport does. If the latter argumentation is advocated, yet 
another drawback is that sea transport will refer to aviation as a ‘benchmark’ and therefore 
another sector will get emissions pricing at a level far from what road transport is currently 
paying. 
5.6 Revisiting the policy packaging framework  
In this section we make some first remarks on how the findings of this report might be utilised 
in order to improve the policy packaging process/framework. This topic will be further 
elaborated on in Deliverable 6 of the OPTIC project. 
In Chapter 4 we identified nine strategies that may be useful for managing barriers to the 
formation and implementation of policy measures/packages in transport. These strategies 
are obviously not exhaustive and specific conditions in each policy case need to be 
considered, as there is no blue-print on which strategies that are suitable. Nevertheless there 
is a need to consciously integrate ‘strategy consideration’ in the policy packaging framework 
developed within the OPTIC-project.  
The typology from Chapter 2 may be used already in stage 2 (see Figure 5.1) of the policy 
packaging process in order to detect policies that are likely to confront substantial barriers. 
This might guide the selection of primary measure(s), but it must be acknowledged that when 
challenging targets are to be met, it may still be necessary to use measures which may con-
front significant barriers. After a more thorough assessment of a preliminary package in 
stage 3, it often turns out that some barriers exist/remain. This is when the strategies 
identified in Chapter 4 may be considered to manage these barriers. This might in turn result 
in adjustment of the policy package, for instance by adding a measure. 
We notice here that conflicts between strategies to manage acceptance barriers and other 
criteria, e.g. effectiveness and efficiency, often occur, and that this needs to be handled 
explicitly in the policy process. Careful attention should be given to the target used in each 
case, and the relationship between that target level and the level required by overall societal 
objectives (e.g. limiting global warming to 2 degrees). What is a success factor with regard to 
a less demanding target may not be applicable to more demanding targets. 
It is also important to keep an eye on the long-term and watch out for ways of barrier 
management that may lead to detrimental long-term developments. There are examples in 
the cases indicating such mechanisms. A successful policy package needs to be flexible or 
robust enough to be able to cope with rather different external developments or new 
knowledge concerning necessary target levels. Part of this is to check whether the policy 
measure(s) in question serve to enable, rather than obstruct, the achievement of long-term 
targets.  
As exemplified by the cases analysed in Chapter 3, in real life the policy formation and/or 
implementation process may be very long. This has implications for the policy packaging 
framework. One is that potential barriers need to be identified early in the process, since e.g. 
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making changes to legislation or developing new technological solutions make take several 
years. The early identification of such barriers may serve to initiate for instance legal 
changes, but it may also serve to shift the focus to other policies that are not dependent on 
legal changes. Another implication is that conditions continuously change. This means that a 
policy package that at some point in time appears to have a slim chance of being accepted 
may well be accepted later on. Either there may be a permanent change, e.g. due to 
increased awareness of a societal problem, or there may appear a window of opportunity, 
e.g. due to a shift in political majority. In both cases, but of course more particularly in the 
latter, it is important to have decision support ready. 
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6 Concluding discussion 
The EU, as well as the rest of the world, is facing great challenges in transforming the 
transport system in a sustainable direction. A key issue for current transport policy making is 
thus to identify policies that are effective in reaching targets, efficient, politically acceptable 
and practically feasible. It is gradually becoming apparent that in order to achieve this dem-
anding task, single policy measures often need to be combined into packages where mea-
sures mutually reinforce each other. This is what the OPTIC project is about. 
One of the main obstacles to the transformation of the transport sector in a sustainable direc-
tion is that even though there are plenty of potentially effective policy measures, many of 
these are rarely or never implemented in practice. The main aim of this work package has 
therefore been to explore barriers and success factors to formation and implementation of 
policy packages in transport, and – based on this – to identify strategies to overcome and 
manage barriers. Identifying relatively specific and elaborated strategies, theoretically 
informed and based in empirical examples, is the main scientific and practical contribution of 
this report. 
Concretely, we focused our work around three main tasks. The first was to elaborate a 
typology that could serve as a framework for our analysis of barriers and success factors in 
empirical cases. This typology might in itself constitute a tool for policy makers to categorise 
and understand barriers and success factors related to the formation and implementation of 
policy packages in transport. The second task was to apply this typology to empirical cases 
from transport policy in order to get an in-depth insight into experiences from policy-making 
and thus also into the kinds of success factors, barriers and strategies that evolve in practice. 
This also constituted the main basis for our third task, namely, to identify more generally valid 
conclusions on strategies to manage barriers to formation and implementation of single 
policy measures and policy packages in transport. 
One main outcome of this report is the identification and further development of a typology 
that helps to distinguish between different policies and to project those that may face difficult 
challenges in policy formation and implementation. For instance, it can be seen that policy 
measures with regulatory (dealing with legislation and sanctions to influence the activities of 
citizens and companies) or redistributive (which imply redistribution of income by taxation) 
content (Lowi, 1964, 1985) tend to be controversial (see also Chapter 2 in this deliverable). 
The same can be said for entrepreneurial policies (where advantages are spread and disad-
vantages focused) (Wilson, 1980). A general principle for policy formation might thus be to 
try to add more distributive and/or client policy features – which in essence means distribu-
ting advantages clearly – to policy measures (single or packages) with a fundamentally 
redistributive, regulatory and/or entrepreneur policy content.  
Some policy objectives will thus be more difficult to achieve than others, and this is much due 
to them requiring more profound changes in mobility patterns and aims to change fundamen-
tal development trends in the transport system. Even though such policy objectives are 
challenging, they may nevertheless be necessary in order to achieve overall societal targets. 
A key example here is the aim for a modal shift which has been stressed as an important 
ambition in several EU and national policy documents including the latest White Paper on 
transport (EC, 2011; CEC, 2006; CEC, 2001). Our selection of case studies partly reflects 
such difficult policies – most evident perhaps in the cases of Urban Congestion Charging and 
Heavy Vehicle Fees. Our findings on barriers, success factors and strategies are thus 
relevant for rather challenging cases of policy formation and implementation.  
A second main outcome from this report is the identification of barriers and success factors 
for policy formation and implementation, which was a result of the analysis of four empirical 
cases: Urban Congestion Charging (with examples from London, Stockholm and Manches-
ter), National Heavy Vehicle Fees (with examples from Switzerland and Germany), Aviation 
 How to manage barriers to formation and implementation                                                      of policy packages in transport 
 
59 
 
in the European Emissions Trading System (EU level), and the EU’s First Railway package 
(with examples from the implementation process in Denmark and Sweden). 
As illustrated in our analysis (Chapter 3), a range of barriers and success factors occur in 
these cases. The Urban Congestion Charging and National Heavy Vehicle Fee cases illu-
strate a broad variety of these. Being typical examples of policy packages with strong redi-
stributive and entrepreneur policy elements, they both faced quite difficult challenges in 
terms of culture/public and stakeholder resistance. They involved political, institutional and in 
some cases also legal difficulties, depending on the specific example in question. Aviation in 
ETS showed some similarities with these two cases in terms of stakeholder barriers, mainly 
from the aviation sector, but did not involve any severe public resistance. The analysis of the 
implementation of EU’s First Railway package in Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, 
is a case of a constituent policy package being put into practice. The barriers that evolved 
there, were mainly about organisational/institutional aspects.  
Our findings on barriers and success factors in the case studies served as the main empirical 
input to the third main task in this work package, namely the identification and development 
of more generally valid strategies to overcome and manage barriers in relation to policy 
formation and implementation. As stated in Chapter 2, a strategy is defined here as a 
conscious and deliberate action to enhance successful policy formation and implementation. 
A strategy, by definition, goes beyond doing things ‘like we have always done’ or just 
‘following established procedures’ (Healey 2007:30, referring to Minzberg 1994/2000 and 
Bryson 2003).  
The main strategies we identified are: 
• Combining sticks and carrots 
• Expanding the policy scope and developing flexibility in negotiations 
• Trials – a way to create legitimacy and acceptance 
• Communicating benefits clearly 
• Using good examples 
• Preparing for windows of opportunity 
• Organisational responsibility and set-up 
• Applying state funding to instigate municipal investments 
• Selection of established or innovative technical solutions 
These strategies are mainly based on empirical evidence from the four case studies 
analysed in this report, but are also supported in other literature. Hence, we consider them to 
be of general relevance for policy making in the transport field and regard them as potentially 
helpful in the policy making process. Some of the strategies are more clearly related to prob-
lems in the policy formation phase, whereas others are more clearly related to 
implementation barriers. Some strategies are valid for both policy formation and 
implementation. Evidently, the best strategies to apply depend on the policy situation and the 
specific conditions at hand.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is uncertain to what extent the strategies proposed here are 
viable for most EU countries. What we suggest in terms of Combining sticks and carrots, 
Expanding the policy scope, Communicating benefits clearly and Using good examples are 
examples of strategies which should in principle be transferable to most national contexts. 
Stronger variation between countries can be expected for strategies that are dependent on 
specific legislative, organisational or institutional settings. The transferability of strategies will 
be further analysed in Deliverable 6 of the OPTIC project. 
Some of the barriers that we identify and explore are related to more fundamental political, 
economical, cultural, organisational and institutional conditions, that relevant actors have 
limited influence upon. As concluded in this report the outcome of a policy making process is 
also highly dependent on the qualities of the people involved, and in particular the existence 
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of political will and leadership. In addition, it is important to note the power of unpredictable 
events – something that policy-makers and implementation agents have little influence over. 
Hence long-term commitment and being prepared when windows of opportunity appears, 
constitute a success factor, as does consistent work to increase the likelihood of such 
windows.  
Nevertheless, a key conclusion is that conscious application of the strategies identified in this 
report may contribute significantly to successful formation and implementation of even 
controversial policies or policy packages.  
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Annex 1: Inventory of success factors and barriers  
 
Based in literature dealing with success factors and barriers for policy formation and implementation within the transport sector an inventory of 
such success factors and barriers has been established as part of D5. In the inventory, success factors and barriers are classified within 
different categories. In some cases it has not been easy to classify the individual success factors and barrier, and they could be classified 
within two categories. However, in the table no barrier is repeated within different categories.  
 
Cultural/public and  stakeholder 
success factors 
Political success factors Organisational/ 
Institutional success factors  
Fiscal/financial  success factors 
 
The public understand the problem 
that a policy measure is designed 
to solve (May 2005: 8). 
 
The public is convinced that the 
proposed policy measure will solve 
the problem (May 2005: 8). 
 
Public and private acceptability of 
policy exist (Banister 2002: 5-6) 
 
A project champion = charismatic 
individual that spearhead projects 
exists (Ieromonachou & Warren 
2008: 114-115). 
 
Politicians are aware that the 
public will judge proposals initially 
based on their short run individual 
 
A national policy framework on 
Spatial Development exists 
(Banister 2002: 5). 
 
Policy directions are consistent 
(Banister 2002: 5). 
 
The objectives of the transport 
strategy are clearly articulated at 
the outset (May 2005: 10). 
 
Policy-makers consider the full 
range of policy instruments (May 
2005: 10). 
 
Decision-makers give full 
consideration to fairness principles 
in developing and justifying their 
 
Power and responsibilities for 
transport is decentralised to the 
most appropriate level for 
implementation (Banister 2002: 5). 
 
Concerns over subsidiarity is not 
used to discourage EU 
involvement in regional and local 
transport policy (May 2005: 9). 
 
An appraisal methodology which is 
consistent across modes and 
policy instruments is applied to 
improve decision-making (May 
2005: 10). 
 
The responsible authority 
possesses solid competences 
within the field (Sørensen 2008: 8). 
 
The responsible authority is in a 
good economic conditions 
(Sørensen 2008: 8). 
 
Where governments decentralise 
decision-making to regional and 
local government, they ensure that 
appropriate levels of funding and 
know-how are also devolved, or 
that effective revenue raising 
powers are provided (May 2005: 
9). 
 
Financial state contributions are 
available for municipal activities 
(Sørensen 2008: 8). 
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gains and losses (May 2005: 8). 
 
The solution is seen as a solution 
to an accepted problem 
(Ieromonachou & Warren 2008: 
118). 
 
Citizens are capable to express 
themselves and behave in ways 
which politicians and civil servants 
respect (Sørensen 2008: 8). 
 
strategies. (May 2005: 8). 
 
Enthusiastic politicians are in 
power and pay attention at 
decisive phases of the process 
(Sørensen 2008: 8). 
 
State action plans and state 
publications exist and function as 
pedagogic policy instruments 
towards municipalities (Sørensen 
2008: 8). 
 
Politicians and transport managers 
avoid aspects of a strategy which 
allow the media or opponents to 
emotionalise an issue (May 2005: 
8). 
 
Incremental implementation is 
applied (Ieromonachou & Warren 
2008: 118). 
 
 
 
The responsible authority is 
capable of using any opportunity to 
advance the issue (Sørensen 
2008: 8). 
 
The responsible authority 
comprises dedicated individuals 
which are committed to the issue 
and are active and persistent 
(Sørensen 2008: 8). 
 
 
Table 1. Inventory of success factors in policy formation and implementation of transport policy. 
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Barriers 
 
Cultural/public 
and  
stakeholder 
barriers 
Political 
barriers 
Legal/ 
regulatory 
barriers 
Organisational/ 
institutional 
barriers  
Knowledge/ 
information 
barriers 
Fiscal/financial 
barriers 
Technological 
barriers 
 
Lack of public 
acceptability 
(Banister 2002: 2) 
 
Public, political 
and media 
resistance to 
policies (May 
2005: 2). 
 
Strong desire of 
urban residents to 
use their cars as of 
right (Banister 
1998: 77). 
 
Increasing 
reluctance of 
people to use 
public transport 
and cycle/walk 
even for local trips 
(Banister 1998: 
76). 
 
A scheme involves 
partners and 
actors who have 
very different 
 
Lack of national 
policy framework 
(May 2005: 2). 
 
Technical and 
individualistic 
focus of policy 
interventions 
(Whitmarsh et al 
2009: 074-975). 
 
Fragmented 
(piecemeal, sector-
specific) 
characteristics of 
policy (Banister 
1998: 77; 
Whitmarsh et al 
2010: 975). 
 
Narrow (regime-
dominated, non-
participatory focus 
of policy 
development 
(Whitmarsh et al 
2009: 975). 
 
Policy dominated 
 
Unsupportive legal 
and regulatory 
frameworks 
(Banister 2002: 2; 
May 2005: 2). 
 
 
Problems with not 
coordinated 
actions (Banister 
2002: 2, May 
2005: 2). 
 
Inefficient and 
counterproductive 
roles and 
procedures (May 
2005: 2). 
 
Application of 
general planning 
and car parking 
standards which 
are inappropriate 
and unachievable 
in a town 
centre/high street 
context. (Banister 
1998: 77). 
 
 
 
Poor data quality 
and quantity (May 
2005: 2). 
 
Analytic obstacles 
(May 2005: 2). 
 
Side effects hinder 
implementation 
(Banister 2002: 2). 
 
 
 
 
Resource barrier 
(Banister 2002: 1). 
 
Weaknesses in the 
pricing and fiscal 
frameworks (May 
2005: 2). 
 
Misguided 
financing and 
investments flows 
(May 2005: 2). 
 
Parking is a major 
use of urban land, 
yet it is not priced 
to reflect its value 
(Banister 1998: 
77). 
 
Uncertainty over 
the funding of 
public transport 
and other green 
modes (Banister 
1998: 77). 
 
 
Engineering 
design and 
availability of 
technology limit 
progress (May 
2005: 6). 
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expectations and 
conflicting 
motivations 
(Ieromonachou & 
Warren 2008: 
116). 
 
Futility argument is 
applied: The 
planned reform 
should not be 
implemented, 
since it will have 
no effects 
(Andersson & 
Vedung 2007: 6). 
 
by short-term 
targets and 
electoral cycles 
(Whitmarsh et al 
2009: 975). 
 
Conflicts with other 
policies (Banister 
2002: 2). 
 
Wavering political 
commitment (May 
2005: 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Inventory of barriers in policy formation and implementation of transport policy. 
 
 
 
Annex 2: Check list for interviews 
 
• Introduce yourself and WP5 broadly 
• Questions to the interviewee: 
o his/her background + how he/she has been involved in the case in question 
 
o In general, how would you describe the process for the policy package in 
question from start to end? 
 
 How did it all start? When? Where? For what reason? Key events, key 
actors etc  
 How did the process from formulation to implementation develop over 
time? (if relevant, use the different “stages” from policy formulation to 
implementation as a way to structure this and other questions) 
 Looking closer at barriers; what were the things/issues/events/actors 
etc that made the adoption and implementation more difficult? (Legal, 
institutional, financial or other resources, technical problems, 
acceptance….etc?) Why did they appear, what were the key content 
and context  factors behind etc? 
 Looking closer at success factors: what where the 
things/issues/events/actors etc that made the adoption and 
implementation more easy or helped to overcome barriers? Why did 
they prove successful, what were the key content and context  factors 
behind etc? 
 Was the combination of policies in a “package” in this case something 
that made the adoption and implementation more difficult or perhaps 
easier? (make sure to clarify if some things said here are valid for the 
whole implementation process (including formulation) or only for some 
specific stage of the process – if it is at all relevant to separate clearly 
between them in the case) 
 Did the ambition to overcome barriers have any effect on the design of 
the policy-package in question? (trade-offs to enable public 
acceptance, for instance)  
 
o What is the status, today, of the policy package in question? Are everyone 
more or less happy with it as it is or are there any current ambitions to change 
it in any way? 
o What are your general reflections on adoption and implementation of policies 
and policy packages, based upon this case + more in general? Lessons for 
the future? 
 
